Analytical approaches to protection planning in rail-truck intermodal transportation by Sarhadi, Hassan
ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO PROTECTION PLANNING IN RAIL-
TRUCK INTERMODAL TRANSPORTATION 
by 
 
© Hassan Sarhadi 
A Dissertation Submitted to the  
School of Graduate Studies 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Faculty of Business Administration 
Memorial University of Newfoundland 
 
 
May 2015 
St. John’s        Newfoundland and Labrador 
i 
 
ABSTRACT 
A significant volume of traffic uses a rail-truck intermodal transportation network, 
making it the preferred transportation medium for customers. Thus, the associated 
infrastructure of rail-truck intermodal transportation should be considered critical, i.e., 
systems and assets whose destruction (or disruption) would have a crippling effect on 
security, economy, public health, and safety. Disruptions could be induced by nature such 
as hurricane Katrina in 2005, or man-made disturbances such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
in the United States. This thesis proposes an analytical approach to preserve, as much as 
possible, the functionality of a rail-truck intermodal transportation system in the wake of 
worst-case attacks. As such, it will serves as an aid to the top managers to compare the 
cost of implementing protective measures with the benefits that such measures could 
bring. A tri-level Defender-Attacker-Defender (DAD) approach is proposed to model this 
situation, where the outermost problem belongs to the network operator with a limited 
budget to protect some of the terminals, the middle level problem belongs to the attacker 
with enough resources to interdict some of the un-protected terminals, and the innermost 
problem belongs to the intermodal operator who attempts to meet the demand on a 
reduced network with the minimum cost. Since the resulting model is very difficult to 
solve by any optimization package, efficient solution techniques have been developed for 
solving this model. Finally, the proposed framework is applied to the rail-truck 
intermodal transportation network of a Class I railroad operator in North America to 
discover the optimal way to protect the system.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Critical infrastructure, as defined by the U.S. Government, consists of systems and assets, 
physical or virtual, which have a vital role to the society such that destruction of them 
would have a crippling effect on security, economy, public health, safety or any 
combination of these. 
The infrastructures of supply chains, like other kinds of critical infrastructures, are 
susceptible to risk of failures. Recent high-profile events, like the attacks of 11 September 
2001, hurricane Katrina, and earthquakes in Japan, especially the ones that hit nuclear 
power stations in March 2011, clearly show how disruptions can plague supply chains 
and impose direct and indirect costs to society. In response to these events, the United 
States and other countries have started initiatives to assess threats to critical 
infrastructures and to develop defense plans that help prevent attacks and mitigate their 
effects.  This is especially important during strategic planning because long term 
decisions, like network design and facility location, cannot be easily modified. 
In an effort to increase common understanding about the risks that supply chains are 
facing, Chopra and Sodhi (2012) have categorized a variety of risks, including the risk of 
disruption, for supply chains together with their drivers. They defined disruption as a risk 
that negatively influences the flow of material anywhere in the supply chain which can 
happen due to war or terrorism, natural disasters, and labour strikes.   
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It should be noted that in addition to the surge in the number and magnitude of risks in 
recent decades, tightly optimized and lean supply chain practices are contributing to the 
vulnerability of these systems. Thus, in contradiction to conventional wisdom, it can be 
argued that supply chains should have more redundancy to provide a buffer against 
uncertainties and risks. Nevertheless, companies have historically been reluctant to invest 
in additional supply chain infrastructure or inventories despite large payoffs that such 
investments can have if a disruption happens. Yet, some companies, like WalMart, have 
launched programs like business continuity planning (BCP) to smooth their operations 
during various disruptions (Buffy, 2006). 
In recent years, growing freight volumes, increasingly congested roads, and 
environmental concerns have contributed to the prominence of rail-truck intermodal 
transportation such that the volume of such traffic has increased more than three times in 
the last three decades (AAR, 2015). Despite such importance, the issue of vulnerability 
assessment of rail-truck intermodal transportation to disruptions and taking preventive 
fortification plans has not been investigated so far.  
1.2 Literature Review 
This literature review discusses the planning efforts to address disruptions in supply 
chains in general and rail-truck intermodal transportation in particular. In the first part of 
this literature review, the research efforts regarding the disruption management will be 
categorized and presented. In order to better understand how to manage disruptions, it is 
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necessary to know all the activities around managing disruptions. In the first part of this 
literature review, these key activities will be presented.    
The context of rail-truck intermodal transportation will be elaborated in the second part of 
the literature review.    
1.2.1 The Disaster Operations Life Cycle   
There is a need to organize activities that can be done before and after the occurrence of 
the disaster. The efforts to organize such operations began with Tufekci and Wallace 
(1998) who organized activities into two categories, pre-event and post-event activities. 
Pre-event activities include predicting and analyzing potential threats and preparing plans 
to lessen their effects while the post-event activities contain locating, allocating and 
managing available resources for an effective response. Therefore, a successful disaster 
relief plan should integrate activities of both categories.     
In an extensive review, Altay and Green (2006), in line with United States emergency 
management practice (NEHRP, 2009) further categorized a disaster operations life cycle 
as having four phases: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Mitigation is the 
combination of measures to either prevent the disaster or to reduce its effects. 
Preparedness includes activities to prepare the community to respond when the disaster 
hits. Response is the actual employment of resources and emergency procedures to 
preserve lives and properties. Finally, recovery involves the actions taken after the 
occurrence of a disaster to stabilize the situation and to restore it to normalcy. In a similar 
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way, Wright, Liberatore, and Nydick (2006) identified four phases for a disaster relief life 
cycle as: planning, prevention, response, and recovery. While the response and recovery 
are exactly the same as defined by Atlay and Green (2006), they have defined the 
planning as the set of long term and strategic activities including policy and risk analysis, 
system design, and resource allocation. Prevention, on the other hand, embraces short-
term activities, like patrolling borders and screening airline passengers, to identify and 
eliminate threats.  
Among pre-disruption activities, the planning is deemed to play the major role because it 
has a significant impact on post-disruption activities like response and recovery. In order 
to better understand this important phase of disruption management, in the remainder of 
this review, the major planning efforts regarding disruptions in supply chains will be 
categorized in three major classes as shown in Figure 1-1: 
 Network design and facility location models: in these models the question is how 
to design networks or to locate facilities at the beginning to satisfy all the demands 
and to hedge against future interruptions in the best way; 
 Vulnerability assessment: in these models, the emphasis is on preparing for the 
worst-case by finding the set of system components that, if lost, would 
dramatically deteriorate the system performance;     
 Fortification planning: these models extend the interdiction and design models. 
For networks that have been formed and their complete redesign would be too 
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costly, fortification models show how to allocate limited resources to improve 
their performance against possible disruptions; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2.2 Network Design and Facility Location Models   
In network design models the assumption is that no network currently exists and therefore 
these models start from scratch to form a network that can satisfy the demands as well as 
withstand against disruptions. More specifically, the main premise of these models is that 
the impact of disruptions can be mitigated by the initial design of a system.  
Thus, in the network design models, a network of arcs and nodes needs to be created 
where each node serves as either a source, a sink or a transshipment node and the whole 
network is responsible for delivering the commodities from the source node to the sink 
node using arcs and transshipment nodes. 
A rather similar design problem against disruption, with important practical applications 
in the design of telecommunication networks, is the survivable network design (SND) 
Figure 1-1. The proposed taxonomy of planning 
efforts in disruption management studies 
Planning in Disruption Management Studies 
Network Design and 
Facility Location 
Vulnerability 
Assessment 
Fortification Planning  
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problem which seeks a minimum cost robust network configuration that provides a 
number of alternative paths between nodes of the network (Grotschel, Monma & Stoer, 
1995). SND problems consist of selecting links so that the sum of their costs is minimized 
while some given requirements (like minimum number of paths between every pair of 
nodes that have to exist in any situation) are satisfied. Implementing the SND principle 
ensures that, after the occurrence of the disruption, the service could be restored around 
the damaged components. This is because alternative paths will be used in this situation 
to reroute traffic and bypass the damaged components. In most SND studies the random 
failure of a single network component has been considered which may not guarantee 
network robustness against intentional disruptions (Kerivin & Mahjoub, 2005).  
In facility location models, each facility provides services to its neighboring customers 
and the problem is where to locate these facilities to minimize the total cost of accessing 
them from customers’ locations.  
Snyder and Daskin (2005) extended the classical p-median and uncapacitated fixed 
charge location problems to account for failures of facilities. Also, Peng, Snyder, Lim, 
and Liu (2011) proposed a mathematical model for designing a logistics network that can 
perform well in pre- and post-disruption conditions.   
Resilient design of coverage-based service systems has been accomplished by O’Hanley 
and Church (2011). The authors proposed a model that aims to locate a set of facilities 
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such that the combination of initial demand coverage and the minimum coverage 
following a loss is maximized. 
However, for the networks or facilities that have been formed, redesigning the entire 
system is not always a reasonable solution given the high costs involved with relocating 
facilities and building new networks, and so this is why other strategies should be 
pursued. 
First, in order to assess the significance of disruptions on a given system, the worst-case 
vulnerability analysis needs to be done with the aid of interdiction models. Then, after 
getting a sense of the magnitude of disruptions, in order to optimize the fortification of 
the system, fortification models can be used to decide which parts of the existing network 
should be fortified. In other words, as a less costly alternative, the resistance of existing 
infrastructures can be enhanced through efficient investments in protection and security 
measures. Planning for network protection is an enormous challenge given the complexity 
of today’s logistics systems, the interdependencies among them, and the diversity of 
hazards and threats. 
1.2.3 Vulnerability Assessment 
Most infrastructure systems are designed to handle disruptions that result from accidents 
and random acts of nature. The system reliability techniques have been proposed for 
estimating vulnerability through finding cut-sets, which are the sets of events that are 
most likely to disrupt a system. The system is robust if the combined probability of such 
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events is sufficiently low. The downside of this kind of analysis is that the infrastructure 
that resists against random failure or whose cut-sets have a low probability of occurrence, 
may not resist against low probability but high consequence disruptions, like an 
intelligent malicious attack, and this is why reliability analysis is not enough to prevent 
against high consequence low probability events (Garcia, 2008).   
Interdiction models have been used extensively over the past few years as a tool for 
assessing network vulnerabilities against worst-case disruptions. As the first step into 
modeling deliberate attacks, interdiction models have a long history in military and 
homeland security operations. Interdiction problems are inherently bi-level since they 
involve conflicting decisions of an interdictor, who tries to degrade the system 
performance, and decisions of system users who try to operate the system in an optimal 
way after interdictions.  
The interdiction studies can be categorized in two classes: network interdiction and 
facility interdiction. In network interdiction, which forms the majority of interdiction 
studies, the effect of losing network components, like arcs and nodes, on some network 
models has been studied. These network models are mainly the minimum cost flow, the 
shortest path, and the maximum flow models. Besides modeling the interruption of flow 
and paths, there has been some research on modeling the effects of interdiction on the 
overall connectivity of the network. In this regard, Grubesic, O’Kelly, and Murray (2003) 
studied the loss of internet services and communication connectivity when certain internet 
backbone links are disrupted.  
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The maximum flow interdiction problem takes place on a network with designated source 
and sinks nodes with capacitated arcs. The objective is to find a set of flows from source 
to sink that obey flow balance and capacity constraints, and moves as much total flow 
from the source to the sink as possible. Since the user’s goal is to maximize the flow, the 
interdictor has the goal of minimizing the user’s maximum flow. The effect of 
interdiction on the maximum flow problem was studied in Wollmer (1964), and Wood 
(1993).  
Wollmer (1964) represents the earliest mathematical study of an instance of network 
interdiction. Wollmer explores the problem of finding the most critical link, or the arc 
whose removal minimizes the maximum flow from the source node to the sink node, in a 
capacitated flow network. In this study, the interdictor can destroy exactly one arc and the 
user aims to maximize the flow on the remaining network.  
Ratliff, Sicilia, and Lubore (1975) broadens Wollmer’s (1964) basic model to the problem 
of finding a set of arcs in a capacitated network whose removal minimizes the maximum 
flow from the source node to the sink node. While investigating problems of drug 
interdiction, Wood (1993) generalized these models to allow for an interdiction using 
general resource constraints instead of cardinality constraints.   
Related to Wood (1993), the network interdiction model of Washburn and Wood (1995) 
establishes the game between an evader, who wants to traverse paths without being 
detected, and an interdictor, who aims to detect the evader by placing inspection points on 
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some network arcs. The interaction between these two players is modeled as a two-
person, zero-sum, simultaneous game (Cournot) and thus is quite different from 
traditional bi-level interdiction models.  
More specifically, an interdictor places inspectors strategically on some arcs of a 
transportation network to maximize the chance of detecting the evader, who could be a 
drug smuggler, moving secretly on that network. If the evader traverses arc   when an 
inspector is present, he will be detected with the probability   ; otherwise the evader 
won’t be detected.  
In a simultaneous game, none of the players can observe the other’s actions before acting 
himself. Therefore, the solution for this model portrays probabilistic mixed strategies for 
both players. In this case, the interdictor’s strategy defines a probability distribution over 
the inspections’ locations, and the evader’s strategy defines a probability distribution over 
different paths in the network. This is in a sharp contrast with solutions of bi-level 
sequential network interdiction models where deterministic pure strategies for both 
players will be found.   
In the shortest path network interdiction, the user of the network seeks the shortest path 
from the source node to the sink node while the interdictor wishes to take some actions to 
maximize the user’s shortest path cost. Interdiction in this case usually refers to 
eliminating arcs or increasing lengths of arcs.  
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In this regard, Fulkerson and Harding (1977) and Golden (1978) investigate the problem 
of maximizing the length of the shortest path in a network to slow enemy advancements 
using models in which the length of each network arc can be increased linearly within 
limits based on the amount of interdiction resources applied to it. In a closely related 
problem, Malik, Mittal, and Gupta (1989) seeks the k-most-vital-arcs in the network in 
which k arcs will be interdicted and interdiction decisions are binary. If an arc is attacked 
and it becomes destroyed its length becomes infinite, or if it is left unaffected it keeps its 
original length. Israeli and Wood (2002) developed the general resource constraint 
version of this problem.  
In the minimum cost flow interdiction problem, arc costs and capacities are given 
together with supplies and demands at every node. The network user tries to meet all the 
demands while considering the capacity constraints on each arc and minimizing total 
costs. As long as the material is homogenous, the minimum cost flow problem will be the 
best way of satisfying all the demands and minimizing the total costs, whereas when 
materials are heterogeneous, the multi-commodity network flow problem, which 
considers pairs of demands of different types, is the suitable modeling framework. In 
either case, the interdictor attempts to disrupt the network by removing a set of arcs to 
maximize the minimum cost of satisfying demands. As a clear example of this type of 
interdiction, Lim and Smith (2007) studied the revenue maximization variant of multi-
commodity network interdiction which, in the lower level, the network user maximizes 
the revenue by shipping commodities on the network and on the higher level the 
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interdictor destroys arcs to minimize the maximum revenue that the network user can 
make.  
More recently, interdiction models have been developed for service networks composed 
of facilities. The first published work in the facility interdiction of service networks was 
that of Church, Scaparra, and Middleton (2004). They devised two basic interdiction 
models known as r-interdiction median problem (RIM) and r-interdiction covering 
problem (RIC). The objective of both of these models is to find among   existing 
facilities a subset of   facilities whose loss would cause the worst-case service delivery to 
customers.  
The RIM is the direct opposite of the well known p-median problem. The objective of the 
p-median problem is to determine the best places of   facilities among a given number of 
potential places to satisfy customer demands and to minimize the demand-weighted total 
distance. The RIM on the other hand, seeks to maximize the demand-weighted total 
distance by disrupting   facilities out of   facilities when the customers of these   
facilities must be reassigned to other unaffected facilities.   
It should be noted that using deterministic strategies in the bi-level network interdiction 
may bring uncertainty elements into consideration. Cormican, Morton, and Wood (1998) 
developed a stochastic programming version of the maximum flow interdiction problem 
to examine how the interdictor can minimize the expected maximum flow when 
interdiction successes are not guaranteed. They also studied the situation in which arc 
13 
 
capacities are uncertain. Whiteman (1999) also considered uncertainty using Monte Carlo 
simulation of maximum flow interdiction models.  
It is worth mentioning that the use of an interdiction framework does not always presume 
the existence of an intelligent attacker. The interdictor sub-problem is merely used as a 
way to estimate the worst-case situation. Therefore, this framework is also applicable to 
problems involving natural disasters when the impact of disruptions are severe enough to 
warrant a highly risk-averse decision making strategy based on minimizing the effects of 
the maximum possible damage. 
1.2.4 Fortification Planning 
A crucial issue in today’s distribution and supply systems is to guarantee continuity and 
efficiency in service provision in the face of natural and man-made threats. If limited 
protective resources are available to increase system robustness, a key question is how to 
allocate these resources in order to preserve the functionality of the whole system as 
much as possible in the case of disruptions.      
At first glance, it seems that the only way to prevent, or even mitigate, the negative 
impacts of disruptions is through the use of design models to dramatically change the 
initial configuration of the system. However, redesigning the entire system is not always 
possible due to its large expenses. Instead, methods for protecting existing systems may 
not only be preferable over the short term, but may also lead to more benefits over the 
passive design strategies in the long term. In addition, many design models are suitable 
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for situations when natural or accidental attacks are major concerns. Therefore, it is 
obvious that modeling protection strategies against intentional attacks, which are worst-
case situations, is completely different since intelligent agents will try to inflict the 
maximum harm and may adjust their offensive strategies to circumvent initial design 
measures.  
One of the popular techniques for infrastructure protection planning against deliberate 
attacks is probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) (Kumamoto & Henley, 1996) which 
extends the traditional risk assessment for non-deliberate attacks (like natural disasters, 
technological failure, and accidents) to deliberate and intentional attacks. The PRA, 
which is quite common among many organizations including the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, in its simplest case scores the risk associated with individual attack 
scenarios as Risk=Threat*Vulnerability*Consequence. The threat is the probability of a 
particular attack, vulnerability is the probability that such an attack would be successful 
and the consequence points to the damage incurred by a successful attack in terms of 
economic losses or lives lost. In order to assess these quantities, subject-matter experts 
must be involved. Then, a prioritized investment plan based on the risk scores will be 
created. The PRA, as just described, has some shortcomings.  
First, it requires that event probabilities be defined as static inputs. But, the static 
probabilities are inappropriate for modeling behaviour of an intelligent adversary since 
intelligent adversaries can collect information (Mosleh, Bier & Apostolakis, 1988). 
Furthermore, even if PRA could measure risks correctly by static inputs, it offers no 
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optimized method for allocating a limited budget to minimize the risk. The method of 
spending down the prioritized list until a budget limit is reached is unlikely to be optimal.  
Another tool for optimizing the protection planning is game theory. Game theory 
provides a suitable framework for modeling interaction of different players in this 
environment. The players can be categorized as:  
 Those who want to protect their infrastructure against attacks (the network 
owners); 
 An adversary who is likely to see the protection efforts and wants to maximize the 
damage (the interdictor); 
 People who will see the result of interdictor’s attacks and will try to use the 
attacked infrastructure in the best possible way (the users).  
In Brown, Carlyle, Salmerón, and Wood (2005, 2006), two sorts of models to help 
safeguard systems were introduced: Attacker-Defender (AD), and Defender-Attacker-
Defender (DAD). Attacker-Defender, as a bi-level model, reveals the critical components 
in the network that would be attacked. On the other hand, Defender-Attacker-Defender, 
as a tri-level model, portrays the best set of decisions for the Defender to hedge the 
network against the worst-case attacks of the interdictor. Also, they argued that when the 
effect of attacking a system component can be easily computed, the simpler bi-level 
Defender-Attacker model is capable of finding the best fortification decisions. Finally, the 
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authors provided examples of applying these methods in protecting the strategic 
petroleum reserve, patrolling the border, and the electric power grid. 
Church and Scaparra (2007) add protection of critical facilities to the basic RIM model. 
The new model, which is called interdiction median problem with fortification (IMF), 
seeks to identify   facilities to be protected in a network of service facilities consisting of 
  facilities while   facilities are going to be interdicted. The objective of this model is to 
minimize the total demand-weighted shortest distance between     non-interdicted 
facilities and customers. The disruptions which render   facilities inoperable try to 
maximize the demand satisfaction cost, thus the network planner and the interdictor have 
conflicting objectives. It is also assumed that the interdictor has knowledge of which 
facilities have been protected. Since the formulation of IMF is based on enumerating all 
possible combinations of attacking   facilities out of   facilities, the number of feasible 
solutions grows exponentially with the increase in   and   and this results in a long 
computational time when solving it by the CPLEX solver. Scaparra and Church (2008a) 
develop a new formulation, called the maximal covering problem with precedence 
constraints (MCPC), to solve larger instances of the IMF. The new formulation has the 
advantage of reducing the size of the problem and thus larger problems can be solved to 
optimality by the CPLEX solver.  
In another paper by the same authors, a bi-level expansion of the RIM referred to as R-
Interdiction Median Problem with Fortification (RIMF) is proposed. The lower level of 
the RIMF corresponds to the RIM described earlier in which the interdictor, as the 
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follower, has to solve an interdiction problem. The upper-level of the RIMF is the 
fortification problem of the defender, as the leader. The proposed solution technique of 
the RIMF performs an implicit enumeration on a search tree. The main principle of this 
technique is based on the observation that at least one of the facilities that would be 
interdicted in the worst-case interdiction, or in the solution of the lower-level RIM, must 
be protected. This intuitive observation is repeatedly used in order to reduce the size of 
the search space. Thus, larger instances of RIMF can be solved to optimality by using this 
search tree.   
Aksen, Piyade, and Aras (2010) introduce two new aspects into the original RIMF model: 
general budget constraints for interdictions, as opposed to cardinality constraints, and 
limited but flexible capacity of facilities. Each facility has a flexible service capacity 
which has been determined at the outset according to the pre-attack assignment of 
customers. When a facility is interdicted, its customers pursue the nearest intact facility 
and this necessitates a capacity expansion in that facility proportional to the new demand 
reassigned to it. This new version is solved to optimality using an adaptation of the 
implicit enumeration algorithm described earlier on a binary tree.  
In a later paper, Aksen, Aras, and Piyade (2013) augment their 2010 paper by adding 
facility location concerns. More specifically, the defender needs to simultaneously decide 
where to locate facilities and which facilities to protect. This paper represents the first 
effort in integrating location, protection, and interdiction decisions on a median-type 
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facility service network as a static Stackelberg (Stackelberg, 1952) game between a 
defender and an attacker.   
In an effort to supplement the traditional network design models with the subsequent 
decisions of the interdictor, Smith and Lim (2007) introduced a three-level network 
design model. In the first level, the network designer constructs the network, while in the 
second level the enemy inflicts the damage to the network by reducing the capacity of 
some arcs. Finally, in the third level, the designer maximizes the post interdiction profit 
by solving a multi-commodity flow problem on the remaining network. 
While the need for an all-hazard approach to incorporate the possibility of worst-case and 
random attacks simultaneously is raised in Zhuang and Bier (2007), more recently, the 
idea of inserting probability and uncertainty into traditional fortification models has 
become more appealing. 
Liberatore, Scaparra, and Daskin (2011) studied a variant of RIMF model in which the 
number of attacks is unknown to the defender, and instead, the defender has access to the 
probability distribution of the number of facilities that could be attacked. In this case, the 
defender must safeguard the system against the expected number of attacks. The 
extension of fortification models by Zhu, Zheng, Zhang, and Cai (2013) embraces the 
vulnerability of protected facilities by attaching a probability of success to each protection 
decision of the defender. Subsequently, the impact of random attacks, the attacks when 
the target cannot be predicted, in the median type system of facilities, is discussed in 
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Zhang, Zheng, Zhu, and Cai (2014). In this case, the defender needs to preserve the 
system in a way that minimizes the expected cost of operating the system. Furthermore, in 
the same paper, the authors introduce a unified model that integrates worst-case and 
random attacks. Random attacks happen due to 1) misplacement or observation errors in 
the attacker’s side in imposing intentional attacks or 2) natural disasters. In both cases of 
random attacks, the defender is unable to predict where the attack is going to happen. 
Therefore, the defender has to protect the system against both types of random and worst-
case attacks.  
1.2.5 Rail-Truck Intermodal Transportation 
Rail-truck intermodal transportation is one of the most important parts of modern supply 
chains. In 2014, according to the Association of American Railroads (AAR), intermodal 
transportation was responsible for almost 22 percent of total revenue for major U.S. 
railroads surpassing the transportation of coal, which traditionally was the largest source 
of revenue for railroads. Also, the volume of intermodal traffic has increased dramatically 
from 3.1 million containers and trailers in 1980 to 13.5 million containers and trailers in 
2014 (AAR, 2015). 
Broadly speaking, rail-truck intermodal transportation refers to the transportation of 
freight from origins to destinations by a sequence of rail and truck transportations. 
Transfers from one mode to the other are performed at intermodal terminals. 
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The fundamental idea of intermodal transportation is to consolidate small loads for 
efficient long-haul transportation (by ocean vessels or rail), while using convenient local 
pick-up and delivery operations of trucks. In many cases, intermodal transportation is 
container-based transportation. The focus here is on rail-truck transportation of containers 
which has four main decision makers: drayage operator, terminal operator, network 
operator and intermodal operator. The drayage operator is responsible for the planning 
and scheduling of trucks between the terminals and shipper/receiver locations. The 
terminal operators take care of the terminal operations like loading, unloading and storage 
of containers. The network operator takes care of the infrastructure planning and 
formation of train services. Finally, the intermodal operator organizes the transportation 
of shipments on behalf of shippers by selecting the best available routes and services for 
each shipment (Macharis & Bentekoing, 2004). 
This model of transportation is quite different from the traditional rail carload service 
which has been in the spotlight of the academic community in previous decades (Assad, 
1980; Haghani, 1989). A fundamental aspect of carload service is that individual cars are 
grouped into blocks and that all the cars within the same block travel together over long 
distances. Such blocks are being formed in classification yards where cars are transferred 
from one block to another and blocks are placed on or dropped from trains. 
Intermodal traffic is now carried by exclusive intermodal trains operating between 
intermodal terminals and bypassing classification yards entirely. The intermodal network 
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of major U.S. railroads is also completely distinct from their regular freight traffic 
network and they only share main line tracks and other related infrastructure. 
Another distinction between intermodal trains and regular freight trains is emanating from 
the fact that in the intermodal trains, the travel of railcars, or containers, from the 
shipper’s location to the intermodal terminal happens over the road. This is completely 
different from the established tradition in regular freight trains in which railcars typically 
travel by a local freight train on a private rail line to the origin classification yard. The 
reverse of this process happens at the destination yard, and thus the entire travel of 
railcars is by rail.     
Yet another major difference between intermodal trains and traditional freight trains is 
that the former ones operate on a fixed schedule and are quite punctual, as opposed to the 
non-schedule based services of traditional freight trains.  
Considering the extreme prominence of rail-truck intermodal transportation, any effort to 
improve efficiency, competitiveness and reliability is highly valuable. Morlok and 
Spasovic (1995) is one of the first papers that dealt with this issue and identified cost 
reduction in the highway portion of this service as an approach to increase the 
competitiveness of intermodal transportation. In fact, for a long time, rail-truck 
intermodal transportation suffered from a high cost which is mainly due to the drayage 
operations, thereby precluding it from capturing high volumes of freight.  
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A number of studies based on surveys have tried to determine the important 
characteristics of intermodal service from the shipper’s perspective.  
In this regard, Murphy and Hall (1995) have observed that reliability is the most 
important factor for U.S. shippers rather than the cost. More importantly, the shipper’s 
perception of intermodal transportation is believed to have a higher impact on their 
decisions. In Evers, Harper, and Needham (1996), shippers decide on the mode of 
transportation and the specific carrier after they have formed a perception of available 
services. Based on this study, the main determinants of the shipper’s perception are: 
timeliness, availability, firm contract, suitability, restitution, and cost where the first two 
factors are the most important ingredients of the perception.  
In another study, Harper and Evers (1993) have found acceptability of rail-truck 
intermodal transportation as the most important determinant of the extent to which it can 
be regarded as a viable alternative to the traditional truck-based transportation. Based on 
this study, acceptability itself depends on the availability, quality and price of this service.  
The ability of rail-truck transportation to resist against the loss of its infrastructures, 
which can decrease the need for drayage operations and can increase availability and 
quality of this service, is clearly absent in these studies. More specifically, the idea of 
identifying critical components (like terminals and links) and then preparing appropriate 
plans to protect them against disruptions has not been addressed so far. Obviously, one of 
the most important decisions for network owners is to invest in fortification of their assets 
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and this kind of decision also deeply influences the downstream decisions of the 
intermodal operator who tries to select the best combination of rail/truck services to meet 
the demands with the minimum cost. Therefore, integrating decisions of the network 
operator and the intermodal operator will fill this gap.   
1.3 Conclusion 
In this literature review, the body of research regarding disruption planning in supply 
chains has been reviewed. Important planning efforts, like network design and 
interdiction models, have been examined. Based on this review, the issue of disruption 
planning in rail-truck intermodal transportation lacks proper attention and therefore needs 
to be investigated in future research studies. Regarding the high importance of rail-truck 
intermodal transportation, operations research specialists have to take initiatives to 
analytically address these issues and fill the research gap.  
The body of research in the rest of the thesis is classified into four chapters, which study 
four different developments of the original research question presented in Chapter One. In 
this regard, Chapter Two, Chapter Three, Chapter Four, and Chapter Five gradually 
develop and generate my research contributions where each chapter uses the results and 
improvements of earlier chapters. Lastly, Chapter Six reiterates research findings of the 
thesis and outlines a number of suggestions for the future research. Figure 1-2 outlines the 
organization of this thesis and the content of each chapter.  
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1.4 Motivation and Objectives 
Considering the utmost importance of rail-truck intermodal transportation, it is necessary 
to evaluate the vulnerability of this type of transportation against worst-case disruptions 
carefully. Also, proper plans should be provided to reduced such a vulnerability and 
improve the overall performance of the system in the wake of disruptions. Therefore, 
within this research, I endeavor to provide a proper analytical framework and efficient 
Figure 1-2: Structure of the thesis 
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solution techniques to address vulnerability assessment and fortification planning in the 
rail-truck intermodal transportation domain.  
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Chapter 2: A Defender-Attacker-Defender Framework 
to the Optimal Fortification of a Rail-Truck Intermodal 
Terminal Network 
2.1 Introduction 
Critical infrastructure plays a pivotal role in the wellbeing of each economy. Regarding 
their unique importance, a crucial issue in modern supply chains is to guarantee 
continuity and efficiency in the event of natural and man-made threats. Such a task is 
challenging, especially given the finite resources and the complexity of the transportation 
infrastructure.  
In this chapter, we make use of the Defender-Attacker-Defender framework to uncover 
the optimal strategy for fortifying a given number of rail-truck intermodal terminals, such 
that the losses resulting from worst-case attacks are kept at their minimum level.  
The proposed tri-level optimization model then is applied to a realistic-size case study 
and is solved using CPLEX. Finally, the results reveal some managerial insights and 
directions for future research.  
2.2 Problem Description 
In this section, we provide a formal statement of the problem, emphasize its complexity, 
and then state the modeling assumptions.   
The rail-truck intermodal transportation fortification problem entails hierarchical and 
sequential decisions amongst three players, i.e., the network operator, the interdictor, and 
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the intermodal operator (Figure 2-1).  Based on the classification presented in Macharis 
and Bontekoning (2004), the network operator is the owner of the railway infrastructure 
of the intermodal infrastructure such as terminals, tracks, and locomotives. At the highest 
level, the network operator attempts to minimize the cost of the worst-case disruption by 
fortifying a limited number of intermodal terminals.  Note that this is possible only if the 
owner knows the cost of the worst-case attack by the interdictor, and hence the latter’s 
problem is a part of the former’s. Next, in the middle level, the interdictor wants to 
maximize the minimum cost of using the system by attacking a limited number of 
(unprotected) terminals, which is achieved by having complete information about the 
intermodal operator’s problem. Finally, following the interdiction, the intermodal 
operator makes the best use of available resources on the reduced intermodal network 
(and possibly fewer train services) to meet customer demand at the minimum cost. Thus, 
the indicated interaction amongst the three players can be cast as a tri-level fortification 
planning problem using the Defender-Attacker-Defender (DAD) framework.  
It is important to consider the different types of decisions that these three players are 
making. At the highest level, the network operator needs to decide which terminals to 
protect. In the middle level, the attacker decides on what terminals to attack. Finally, in 
the lowest level, the intermodal operator aims to find the best load plan to serve all the 
customers which requires finding the best path for each shipper-receiver pair, and also the 
frequencies of train services to satisfy all the demands with the lowest cost.  
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Figure 2-1: Hierarchical structure of the fortification planning 
To have a better understanding of how a rail-truck intermodal transportation system 
works, it should be noted that this type of transportation comprises three distinct 
processes:  
 Inbound drayage, i.e., trucking service from the shipper location to the 
origin intermodal terminal 
 rail-haul between the intermodal terminals 
 Outbound drayage, i.e., trucking service from the destination 
intermodal terminal to the receiver location.  
A shipment that needs to be transported from the shipper’s location to the receiver’s 
location, first travels by trucks from the shipper’s location to the origin intermodal 
terminal. In the terminal, it will be transshipped from trucks to train and the train is 
responsible for terminal to terminal journey of the shipment. In the destination terminal, it 
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will be transshipped from train to trucks and finally, trucks are responsible for final 
delivery of the shipment to receiver’s location. Figure 2-2 shows this process.  
 
Figure 2-2: A Depiction of Rail-Truck Intermodal Transportation 
The intermodal operator focuses on the entire routing of the shipments, and endeavors to 
find the minimum-cost way to satisfy customer demand, given the available connections 
between the intermodal terminals and shippers/ receivers, and also the existing pre-
defined intermodal train services. 
It is also important to note that this sort of nested interaction among the players, which 
aims to find the best fortification decision to preserve the functionality of the intermodal 
infrastructure in the aftermath of disruption, makes the problem fairly complex.   
2.3 Defender-Attacker-Defender Framework 
In this section, we provide a tri-level mathematical formulation for the fortification 
problem described earlier. 
First, different components of the mathematical formulation, like assumptions, sets, 
parameters and decision variables, need to be defined and then the entire model is 
demonstrated. 
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2.4 Mathematical Model 
2.4.1 Assumptions 
 The demand has been defined for each shipper-receiver pair and is assumed to be 
fixed during the planning period.  
 The locations of terminals, shippers and receivers are assumed to be known. 
Therefore, the distances between any two of them (the length of the line 
connecting them) can be calculated.  
 The set of train services has been defined on the physical network and will be 
considered as an input to the model. The frequency of each service will be decided 
by solving the network operator’s problem. 
 It is assumed that terminals and rail links have enough capacity to handle the 
traffic and also it is assumed that there are always enough empty containers in 
origin terminals. 
 It is assumed that if either the origin or the destination terminal of a given train 
service becomes interdicted, the train service would not be able to operate. 
 It is assumed that if a given terminal becomes interdicted, the remaining terminals 
have enough capacity to make up for that.     
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 Direct trucking is allowed between each shipper-receiver pair to keep the 
intermodal operator’s problem always feasible. Due to its high cost, this type of 
direct shipment normally won’t be used when there is no attack to the system.  
 It is assumed that a protected terminal cannot be interdicted. 
 It is assumed that there is no congestion at the terminals. 
 It is assumed that if intermediate terminals associated with an intermodal train 
service are interdicted, the train can still serve the remaining terminals on its route 
by bypassing those interdicted terminals. 
2.4.2 Sets 
   Set of shippers indexed by   (   ) 
   Set of receivers indexed by   (   ) 
   Set of origin intermodal terminals which is the set of origin terminals for all shipper-
receiver pairs and is indexed by   (   ) 
   Set of destination intermodal terminals which is the set of destination terminals for all 
shipper-receiver pairs and is indexed by   (   ) 
 : Set of train services defined on the physical network and is indexed by       . Each 
service is characterized by its origin terminal, destination terminal, intermediate stops (for 
loading/unloading operations), and its capacity which is the number of containers that 
each train of that service can take. 
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   : Set of train services (     ) connecting terminal   (   ) to terminal   (   ). 
     The set of all service legs for a given train service     indexed by  . Each service 
leg of service     is defined as the rail link between any two consecutive stops of  . 
Therefore, the definition of service leg completely depends on the definition of service 
and the terminals at which it will stop. Let’s take a look at Figure 2-3 to define this set. 
Suppose that train service   (depicted by the dashed line) travels from    (origin) to    
(final destination) and has two intermediate stops at    and   while bypassing   . In this 
case, the rail segment between    and   , the rail segment between    to    and the rail 
segment between     and    are three service legs of this train service and therefore the 
set    is: {      ,       ,       }.  
 
 
 
      The set of pairs of terminals, covered by train service    , for which traveling 
between them entails using the service leg     . Based on Figure 2-3, traveling from    
to    needs to use the first leg, i.e. the leg       . In addition to that, traveling from    to 
   and traveling from    to    also require using the first leg. 
    Set of origin and destination terminals of train service    . 
 : Set of all terminals in the physical network. 
 
               
Figure 2-3. Train Service V defined on the network 
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2.4.3 Parameters 
      The fixed demand between shipper      and receiver     during the planning 
horizon. 
     The fixed cost of forming train service     between its origin terminal and its 
destination terminal. 
      Inbound drayage cost or the cost of sending a container using a truck from the 
shipper     to the origin terminal        . 
     : The cost of directly sending a container using a truck from the shipper     to the 
receiver        .  
    
   Outbound drayage cost or the cost of sending a container using a truck from the 
destination terminal         to the receiver    . 
    
   Train service cost or the cost of sending a container with train service   (   ) from 
origin terminal         to the destination terminal         when service   passes 
between   and  , or simply      . 
    The capacity of the train service    .  
   The maximum number of terminals that the network owner can protect. 
   The maximum number of terminals that the interdictor can destroy. 
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2.4.4. Intermodal Operator’s Decision Variables 
      : Number of containers from shipper     to receiver      that use terminal     as 
their origin terminal. 
      
 : Number of containers from shipper     to receiver     that use terminal     
as their destination terminal. 
        
 : Number of containers from shipper     to receiver     that use intermodal train 
service     to travel from terminal     to terminal     when   passes between   
and  , or      .  
     : Number of containers from shipper     to receiver     which use direct trucking 
service. 
  : Number of trains of service type     during the planning horizon (the frequency of 
the service type  ). 
2.4.5 Network Operator’s Decision Variable 
    Reflects the protection of terminal   (   ) if   =1 
2.4.6 Interdictor’s Decision Variable 
    Indicates the interdiction of terminal   (   ) if   =1  
2.4.7 Mathematical Formulation 
         
Subject to: 
36 
 
                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                                         
                  Subject to:         
                                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                   
                
   
      
   
 
   
       
 
   
      
 
      
             
      
          
         
 
                 
       
   
                                        
 Subject to: 
                 
 
        
                                                                          
          
 
        
       
                                                                        
       
 
   
        
      
                                                                            
           
 
                
                                                                      
                                                            
                                              
                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                    
       
                                                                                              
37 
 
        
                                                               
                                                                                                          
2.4.8 Explanation of the Constraints  
The objective function of the network operator’s problem, the outer problem, tries to 
minimize the total cost. In order to do that, the network operator has to decide which 
terminals to fortify and this is done by the first constraint in which a limited number of 
terminals will be protected. Based on the second constraint, the decision to protect a given 
terminal is a binary decision. The third constraint of the network operator’s problem is 
referring to the whole of the interdictor’s problem. Based on this constraint, the 
interdictor wants to maximize the cost of using the system. Within the network 
interdictor’s problem, the fourth constraint refers to the interdiction of some terminals 
among all terminals, by the interdictor. Based on this constraint, the interdictor has a 
limited budget to interdict a limited number of terminals in the network. The fifth 
constraint points to the binary nature of the interdictor’s decision. The sixth constraint 
connects the decisions of the network operator and the decisions of the interdictor. 
According to this constraint, a protected terminal cannot be interdicted by the interdictor. 
The seventh constraint refers to the whole intermodal operator’s problem. Based on this, 
the network operator tries to minimize the overall cost of using the system. The objective 
function of the intermodal operator’s problem is minimization of the cost of using the 
drayage paths and the rail services. The overall cost of using the system can be divided 
into two parts; the variable cost and the fixed cost.  
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The first three terms of the objective function of the network operator refer to the variable 
cost, i.e. the cost of which is proportional to the number of containers being sent from a 
given shipper to a given receiver. Therefore, the first three terms of the objective function 
calculate the total variable cost over all of the shipper-receiver pairs. The cost of sending 
a container by a truck mainly reflects the operations required to load, unload and transfer 
the container as well as driver hours in the drayage path. The inbound drayage cost is the 
cost proportional to driver hours from the shipper’s location to its origin terminal while 
the outbound drayage cost reflects the driver’s cost from the destination terminal to the 
receiver’s location. Also, the cost of sending a container directly from its shipper to its 
receiver reflects the driver’s cost from the shipper to the receiver. The variable rail 
service cost points to the cost associated with loading/unloading of a container from its 
origin terminal to its destination terminal.  
The fourth set of terms in the objective function denotes the fixed cost of forming train 
services of different types. The fixed cost of forming a train service reflects the cost of 
using human resources in the railway company (brakeman, engineer, and driver) and the 
cost of using the locomotive itself. This cost does not directly depend on the number of 
containers assigned to that service since for any number of containers (up to the train 
capacity) the same resources will be required. 
Within the operator’s problem, the eighth set of constraints points to the conservation of 
flow between a given origin terminal and all of destination terminals (those which are 
accessible from that origin terminal by different train services). In other words, the 
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containers that have been received by a given origin terminal will be transferred to all 
accessible destination terminals.  
The ninth set of constraints is similar to the eighth set since it points to the conservation 
of flow in destination terminals. In other words, the containers that have been transferred 
to a given destination terminal have came from different origin terminals using available 
train services between them. Therefore, each destination terminal will send out 
completely what it has received from the origin terminals and nothing will be lost.  
The tenth set of constraints states that demand must be satisfied for all shipper-receiver 
pairs. Therefore, the containers that have been transferred to a given receiver from 
different destination terminals have to be equal to the demand of the associated shipper-
receiver pair.   
The eleventh set of constraints calculates the frequency (the number of trains) of each 
train service. More precisely, the total number of containers that each train service can 
take during the planning horizon (the right hand side of the constraint) must be greater or 
equal to the total number of containers (from different shipper-receiver pairs) being 
transported on each of its service legs (the left hand side). 
The twelfth set of constraint connects the interdictor’s decision and the intermodal 
operator’s decision in such a way that if a given terminal becomes interdicted by the 
interdictor, then none of the services originating or ending at that terminal can be used 
anymore by the network operator.  Finally, the remaining sets of constraints (13, 14, 15, 
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and 16) are pointing to the integrality and non-negativity of network operator’s decisions 
(frequency and traffic assignment variables).  
2.5 Introducing a Realistic Case Study 
In an effort to explain the complexity of the problem, we reproduce a portion of the 
intermodal service chain network introduced by Verma, Verter, and Zufferey (2012), 
which is represented via a geographical information system (GIS) model using ArcView 
(ESRI, 2008). All resulting mathematical models were solved using CPLEX 12.6.0 (IBM, 
2014). Figure 2-4 and Figure 2-5 respectively depict 18 intermodal terminals and 37 
customers in the network, which are the access points for 399 demand pairs (i.e., shipper-
receiver pairs). A total of 62 types of intermodal train services differentiated by route, 
speed and intermediate stops are connecting these terminals. Among train services 31 
services are of regular type and have been shown in Appendix A, and another 31 services 
are express services and are 25% faster. Finally, the network operator has resources to 
fortify a limited number of terminals, the interdictor has resources to destroy/ disrupt a 
limited number of (un-protected) terminals, and the network operator has to meet demand 
using the reduced intermodal network.   
Terminals Legend Terminals Legend Terminals Legend 
Atlanta Atl Charlotte Cha Chicago Chi 
Cleveland Cle Cincinnati Cin Columbus Col 
Detroit Det Fort Wayne For Indianapolis Ind 
Jacksonville Jac Knoxville Kno Macon Mac 
New York NY Norfolk Nor Philadelphia Phi 
Pittsburgh Pit Richmond Ric Roanoke Roa 
Table 2- 1: Terminal Legends 
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Figure 2-4: Location of 18 Terminals (Adapted from: Verma & Verter, 2010) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-5: Location of 37 Customers (Adapted from: Verma & Verter, 2010) 
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2.5.1 Estimation of Parameters  
Cost: In the United States, trucks can travel at a maximum speed of 50 miles/hour, but 
due to lights and traffic an average speed of 40 miles/hour is assumed (Verma & Verter, 
2010). Normally drayage is charged in terms of the amount of time the crew (driver-
truck) is engaged, and an estimate of 300USD/hour including the estimated hourly fuel 
cost is used. As indicated there are two types of intermodal train services viz. regular and 
express. Average intermodal train speed was calculated using the Railroad Performance 
Measure website (RPM, 2014), and was estimated to be 27.7 miles/ hour for regular, and 
36.8 miles/hour for express service. Consistent with the published works, we estimated a 
rate of 0.875 USD per mile for regular and 1.164 USD per mile for express service. The 
hourly fixed cost of running a regular intermodal train is 500 USD per hour, which takes 
into consideration the hourly rates for a driver, an engineer, a brakeman, and an engine, 
which are 100 USD, 100 USD, 100 USD, and 200 USD, respectively. The express service 
is 50% more expensive at 750 USD per hour (Verma et al. 2012).   
2.6 Numerical Analysis 
In the first part of this section, the network operator (the Defender) has enough money to 
protect one terminal and the interdictor (the Attacker) has enough resources to disrupt one 
terminal while in the second part both of them have enough money to fortify/disrupt two 
terminals.  
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2.6.1 Part One: the Network Operator and the Interdictor Can Protect/Disrupt One 
Terminal 
In this part of the numerical analysis, the network owner has eighteen different strategies 
of protecting terminals (given in the form of tables) and each strategy is then followed by 
seventeen possible attack strategies of the interdictor. After each attack strategy, the 
network operator tries to meet as many demands as possible with the least cost. Appendix 
B summarizes the results of attacking different terminals.  
To show a typical interaction between the network owner and the interdictor, Table 2-2 , 
which is derived from Appendix B, describes the situation when the network operator (the 
first player) protects the terminal located in Atlanta and the interdictor (the second 
player), who knows the first player’s decision, tries to interdict a terminal among the 
remaining unprotected terminals. For each combination of the first two players’ decisions, 
the third player (the intermodal operator) decides to find the best set of services to satisfy 
demands with the least cost.  
Table 2-2: Results of defending/attacking 1 terminal  
According to Table 2-2, the cost associated with defending Atlanta is 12.26 million 
dollars. This is in fact the maximum cost that the interdictor can impose to the system, by 
attacking the terminal located in Philadelphia, following the protection of the terminal 
Defended 
Terminal 
Attacked 
Terminal 
Cost Imposed 
($) 
Computation 
Time (Sec) 
Cost Saving 
($) 
Atl Phi 12,263,378 221.4 378,200 
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located in Atlanta. The cost saving of defending the terminal at Atlanta, and instead 
leaving Philadelphia unprotected, amounts to 378,200 dollars.  
2.6.2 Part Two: the Network Operator and the Interdictor Can Protect/Disrupt Two 
Terminals 
In this part of the numerical analysis, the network owner has 153 different strategies of 
protecting terminals (given in the form of tables) and each strategy is then followed by 
136 possible attack strategies of the interdictor. After each attack strategy, the network 
operator tries to meet as many demands as possible with the least cost. Appendix C 
summarizes the results of attacking different pairs of terminals by the interdictor.  
Table 2-3: Results of defending/attacking 2 terminals  
According to Table 2-3, which is extracted from Appendix C, the best protection decision 
is to protect terminals located in New York and Atlanta and this decision results in the 
total cost of 13.01 million dollars. This is in fact the maximum cost that the interdictor 
can impose on the system, by attacking terminals located in Chicago and Indiana, 
following the protection of terminals located in New York and Atlanta. The cost saving of 
this protection decision is nearly 900,000 dollars which shows the extent to which 
suitable fortification planning can reduce the costs imposed on the system. Also, it is 
interesting to see that the cost saving in the case where two terminals are being 
protected/interdicted is much higher than the case in which one terminal is being 
Defended 
Terminals 
Attacked 
Terminals 
Cost Imposed 
($) 
Computation 
Time (Sec) 
Cost Saving 
($) 
NY, Atl Chi, Ind 13,016,982 1,513 889,593 
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protected/interdicted. This clearly shows that the cost saving of fortification increases 
with the increase in the budget of attacker and defender.  
2.7 Conclusion  
In this chapter, a framework for defending rail-truck intermodal transportation is 
introduced. Then, a mathematical model that can capture the decisions of the players and 
their interactions has been proposed.  
Also, a real case study of the intermodal chain of a railway company in the U.S. has been 
presented. Then, the mathematical model of the Defender-Attacker-Defender problem has 
been solved for the case study to find out the best decisions to protect the infrastructure. 
Due to the complexity of the problem, only two instances of the DAD model have been 
solved; the instances in which one terminal is going to be defended/attacked and the 
instance in which two terminals are going to be defended/attacked.  
The results of applying the fortification planning to the case study reveal huge 
improvements in the cost of running the system in the aftermath of interdictions. In other 
words, after the occurrence of interdictions, the system which has a suitable fortification 
plan is able to satisfy demands with lower cost compared to the systems which are left 
unprotected.    
The current model can be enhanced in a number of aspects. For example, these days, 
many customers are sensitive to the delivery time of their shipments and transportation 
46 
 
companies should take any action to deliver shipments on time. Adding such new aspects 
makes the model more realistic and more applicable for practical situations. 
In terms of solving the model, the proposed DAD model is very difficult. Therefore, 
efficient solution techniques need to be developed to solve large instances of the DAD 
problem efficiently. All these new aspects will be pursued in the next chapter.    
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Chapter 3: Protection Planning of a Rail-Truck 
intermodal Terminal Network: Extensions and Traffic-
based Solution Technique 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the tri-level defender-attacker-defender (DAD) approach proposed in 
Chapter Two will be enhanced in a number of directions so that it better fits to realistic 
situations. In addition to modeling enhancements, a new solution technique based on the 
traffic flow information is proposed that is able to solve this problem in an efficient 
manner. The proposed DAD will be applied to the realistic case study introduced in 
Chapter Two and then it will be solved by the developed solution technique. At the end, a 
variety of analyses has been done on the results to scrutinize the effects of fortification 
planning on the performance of the system.  
3.2 Problem Description 
In this section, the DAD model described in Chapter Two will be expanded in a number 
of directions. It is important to mention that two pertinent factors should be considered in 
making the routing decisions. First, since each intermodal terminal has a finite capacity, 
an interdiction may result in a situation where the remaining terminals in the network do 
not have enough capacity to meet demand. Second, punctuality is the mainstay of 
intermodal shipments (Nozick & Morlok, 1997; Verma et al, 2012), and hence late 
deliveries should be penalized as a function of the time delayed. Also, like the 
mathematical model presented in Chapter Two, direct trucking is permitted between each 
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shipper-receiver to ensure feasible solutions in the intermodal operator’s problem. From 
the mathematical programming point of view, a path-based modeling approach has been 
selected. In this approach, a set of possible intermodal paths for a given shipper-receiver 
pair is identified in the pre-processing phase. Then, a single variable is attached to each 
path. Adopting the path based approach results in fewer variables in the intermodal 
operator’s problem and this will facilitate solving this problem. Therefore, instead of 
attaching three variables to each intermodal path between a given shipper and a given 
receiver, only one variable will be used.      
3.3 Assumptions 
 The demand has been defined for each shipper-receiver pair and is assumed to be 
fixed during the planning period;  
 The locations of terminals, shippers and receivers are assumed to be known. 
Therefore, the distances between any two of them can be calculated;  
 The set of train services has been defined on the physical network and will be 
considered as an input to the model. The frequency of services will be decided by 
solving the network operator’s problem; 
 Rail links have enough capacity to handle the traffic and also it is assumed that 
there are always enough empty containers in origin terminals; 
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 If either the origin or the destination terminal of a given train service become 
interdicted, the train service would not be able to operate; 
 If intermediate terminal associated with an intermodal train service is interdicted, 
the train can still serve the remaining terminals on its route; 
 A protected terminal cannot be interdicted; 
 It is assumed that that the waiting time to receive the handling operations is 
insignificant and thus there is no congestion at the terminals; 
 Each terminal has finite traffic handling capacity, thus the remaining terminals in 
the network may not have enough capacity to make up for the capacity of 
interdicted terminals; 
 Delivery dates are specified when placing the order, and a penalty cost per 
container per hour is incurred for late deliveries; 
3.4 Path-based Defender-Attacker-Defender Framework 
In this section, we develop a tri-level mathematical formulation for the fortification 
problem introduced in the previous chapter, and then propose two distinct solution 
techniques for solving it.   
3.4.1 Mathematical Model 
Our notation and the model are provided below. 
Sets 
51 
 
  Set of shippers, indexed by i 
  Set of receivers, indexed by j 
    Set of intermodal paths between shipper i and receiver j, indexed by p 
   Set of intermodal terminals in the network, indexed by k 
   
   Set of intermodal paths between shipper i and receiver j which uses intermodal 
terminal k as either origin or destination. 
   Set of intermodal train services defined on the network, indexed by v 
    Set of service legs for train service v, indexed by l 
      Set of intermodal paths using service leg l of train service v 
Variables 
   
 
  Number of containers using intermodal path p between shipper i and receiver j 
      Number of containers using direct trucking service between shipper i and receiver 
j 
    Number of train services of type v 
       
1 if terminal   is protected
                            otherwise
   
        
1 if terminal   is interdicted
                               otherwise
   
Parameters 
   Maximum number of terminals that the network owner can protect 
   Maximum number of terminals that the interdictor can disrupt 
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  Cost of transporting a container from shipper i to receiver j on intermodal path p 
      Cost of sending a container using trucks on the shortest path from shipper i to 
receiver j 
   
 
  Expected travel time from shipper i to receiver j on intermodal path p 
     Delivery time using truck on the shortest path from shipper i to receiver j 
      Delivery due date promised by shipper i to receiver j 
     Number of containers demanded by receiver j from shipper i   
      Penalty cost per container per hour between shipper i and receiver j  
    Capacity of train service v 
     Fixed cost of operating train service v 
    Capacity of intermodal terminal k 
(P) 
                  (1) 
subject to: 
                  (2) 
                                                                          (3) 
where, 
                      (4) 
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 subject to:  
                              (5) 
                                                             (6) 
                                                        (7) 
where, 
                
            
 
  
 
     
             
                 
        
            
        
                                                                                                       (8) 
subject to: 
    
 
                                                                 (9) 
      
 
         
                                    (10) 
      
 
       
           
                                    (11) 
                                                                       (12) 
   
                                                                                (13) 
                                                                            (14) 
(P) depicts the tri-level optimization model that will be used to make protection planning 
decisions. It should be mentioned that     is a multi-variable function of   and   such 
that, in each level of the problem, only one of these variables is considered and thus      
reduces to a single-variable function. The outer level problem belongs to the network 
operator whose objective is to minimize total cost in the aftermath of disruptions by 
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fortifying a given number of intermodal terminals. Constraint set (3) enforces the binary 
nature of the terminal fortification decision. The middle level problem belongs to the 
interdictor who intends to maximize the total cost of using the system. Constraints set (5) 
depicts the finite resources available for interdiction or disruption of intermodal terminals, 
whereas (6) represents the binary nature of the interdiction decisions. Constraint set (7) 
combines the decisions of the network operator and the interdictor by prohibiting the 
disruption of fortified terminals. Finally, the inner level problem belongs to the network 
operator who intends to minimize the total cost of using the system. Note that this is a 
variant of the multi-commodity flow problem with capacity, delivery time, and penalty 
cost considerations. The objective function, i.e., (8), will capture the overall cost of 
moving shipments using rail-truck intermodal paths, any direct trucking service if 
applicable, the penalty costs for late deliveries, and the fixed cost of running different 
intermodal trains in the network. Constraint set (9) ensures the demand is satisfied either 
using the intermodal option or through the direct truck service. Constraint set (10) 
enforces the capacity at various terminals in the network, and that the interdicted 
terminals cannot be either origin or destination of intermodal paths to meet the demand. 
Constraint set (11) determines the number of intermodal trains of a specific type needed 
in the network. Finally, the sign and integrality restrictions are imposed through 
constraints set (12) to (14).   
3.5 Numerical Analysis 
3.5.1 Parameter Estimation: 
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Due Dates:  Three different due dates have been defined: long, regular, and short. The 
distance (d in miles) between each shipper and each receiver was estimated in ArcView 
GIS (ESRI, 2008). Next, the travel time (in hours) was computed as d/40, where the 
denominator indicates the speed of trucks.  Finally, constants of 10, 15 and 20 were added 
to the travel time to obtain, respectively, the short, regular and long delivery due dates for 
each shipper-receiver pair. The penalty cost is set at 40 dollars per container per hour of 
lateness. Also, the cost of running train services follows the calculations of the previous 
chapter.  
Demand Levels and Terminal Capacity:  The inner problem belonging to the intermodal 
operator was solved in CPLEX 12.1.0 (IBM, 2014) on the dataset used in Verma et al. 
(2012), and the solution was decoded to estimate the traffic volume through each 
intermodal terminal.  It was assumed that the terminal utilization was 80%, and hence the 
terminal capacity is 1.25 times (i.e., 1 divided by 0.8) the traffic volume through each 
terminal, and the demand level was deemed medium. Finally, we assumed that high 
demand level would account for 95% of terminal capacity and hence multiplied the 
medium demand by 1.1875 (i.e., 95 over 80), whereas low demand would result from 
65% terminal capacity.   
3.6 Solution Algorithms  
In this section, we will first comment on the computational burden of the problem and 
then outline various algorithms that can solve this problem. These solution algorithms are 
as follows. 
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 Complete enumeration 
 Implicit enumeration 
 Traffic-based heuristic 
3.6.1 Complete Enumeration 
Complete enumeration proceeds by determining an exhaustive combination for defending 
and interdicting terminals. For example, for the case of defending/attacking two terminals 
in the network of eighteen terminals, the number of combinations amounts into 
   
 
     
 
        possible defense and attack strategies. For each defense and attack 
strategy, the network operator’s problem is solved assuming that the terminals attacked 
under this strategy have been disrupted. For each given defense strategy, the effect of all 
the ensuing attack strategies will be compared. The worst-case disruption following each 
defense strategy yields the total cost associated with the adoption of that defense strategy. 
The defense strategy with the lowest associated cost will be selected as the best defense 
strategy. Applying this procedure to the current case study will result in protection of 
intermodal terminals in Philadelphia and in Atlanta. The CPU time for this problem 
setting was 902.14 seconds, and it ranged from 241.1 seconds to 2063.18 seconds for the 
other eight scenarios.   
It is easy to see that the complete enumeration technique will become rather cumbersome 
if more than two terminals have to be considered for fortification and interdiction. For 
example, the number of strategies requiring evaluation for the “three terminals” example 
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would be 371,280.  Thus, there is a need for a more efficient solution technique. This will 
be elaborated in the next sections of this chapter.  
3.6.2 Implicit Enumeration  
Under implicit enumeration, we first obtain the list of the worst-case disruptions which 
has been provided by examining all of the attack strategies. For the case of 
attacking/defending two terminals, an exhaustive combination for interdicting two 
terminals for our problem instance will be translated into    
 
      possible attacks. 
Then, for each attack strategy, the intermodal operator’s problem is solved assuming that 
the terminals listed under this strategy have been out of service. The resulting solution 
gives us the total cost associated with each attack strategy, and the worst-case disruption 
would result from the strategy with the highest cost. The corresponding strategy called for 
the interdiction of intermodal terminals in Philadelphia and in Atlanta. This information 
will be passed to the implicit enumeration scheme proposed in Scaparra and Church 
(2008a). This was coded in C# and the entire search took 76.5 seconds. This solution 
algorithm is using a considerably reduced search space collectively containing only the 
defense strategies that will prevent the worst-case disruption. We next provide detail on 
how this enumeration scheme works.  
As indicated above, the decoded solution of the inner problem suggested highest cost by 
interdicting Philadelphia (Phi) and Atlanta (Atl) together.  Hence, fortifying either or both 
these terminals would preclude the worst-case disruption. The implicit enumeration 
scheme starts at the root node, i.e., node 1, by finding the worst-case disruption without 
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fortification (i.e., Phi and Atl). At each node, we determine set O, which lists the 
terminals for which at least one must be protected to prevent the worst-case.  For 
instance, at node 1, terminal Phi or Atl could be fortified. By selecting Phi randomly, we 
branch on either to protect it or not to protect it.   
 
Figure 3-1: Tree Search 
If Phi were not fortified, then the terminal at Atl would have to be considered for 
fortification (i.e., node 2). If even Atl is not fortified, then set O is empty thereby 
implying that none of the other fortifications can prevent the worst-case disruption, and 
the resulting node is fathomed (i.e., grey shade). This means that the worst-case attack at 
node 1 still possible. On the other hand, if Atl is fortified, then the worst-case disruption is 
prevented, and the elements for set O must be updated by solving the interdiction 
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problem with the latest information (i.e., Atl is fortified). Thus, the updated set O contains 
NY and Phi as elements representing the most disruptive interdiction given that Atl is 
fortified. At node 3, only one fortification resource is left, we continue the search process 
by arbitrarily selecting NY. If NY is not fortified, it is possible that it is disrupted together 
with Phi thereby resulting in a fathomed node. But if it is fortified, then the interdiction 
problem is solved given that NY and Atl are fortified.  The updated set O contains Atl and 
Ric, both of which would be interdicted thereby resulting in a cost of around $12.2mn 
(i.e., dark shade).   
At the left branch of node 1, if Phi were fortified, the interdiction problem is solved 
thereby resulting in terminals Ind and Atl in the updated set O.  Arbitrarily selecting Ind, 
if it is fortified then the protection resources have been exhausted, and the resulting 
interdiction problem yields Cha and Atl terminals as the most disruptive. At the same 
time, no further branching is possible and the associated cost is around $12.1mn. But if 
Ind is not fortified, then the updated set O only contains Atl at node 5. If Atl is not 
fortified, then it will be attacked together with Ind thereby being fathomed.  On the other 
hand, if Atl is fortified, then the interdiction problem is solved again to yield Chi and Ind 
as the most disruptive terminals, and the associated cost is around $11.9mn. The search 
cannot continue any further since all the defensive resources have been used. 
The CPU time for the remaining eight scenarios ranged from 16.3 seconds to 336.24 
seconds, which is quite good. We note that, given the definition of criticality for our 
problem instance, it is possible to arrive at the same solution more quickly by combining 
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information about the traffic flow through each terminal and (an adapted version of) the 
implicit enumeration of Scaparra and Church (2008a).   
3.6.3 Proposed traffic-based heuristic   
The proposed heuristic works in two steps. First, the capacitated multi-commodity flow 
problem for the network operator is solved (i.e., the inner level problem in (P)). The 
resulting solution is decoded and the traffic volume through each terminal is estimated 
and ranked, in descending order, of throughput terminal traffic.  Since there is enough 
resource to protect two terminals, fortifying the top two candidates on the list would make 
the worst-case disruption impossible.   
In the second step, just like Scaparra and Church (2008a), the identity of the two 
terminals was supplied as input at the root node 1 in Figure 3-1. If Phi were fortified, then 
we update set O by including the third terminal from the list generated in step one. For 
instance, at node 4 in Figure 3-1, Ind would be selected from the list without solving the 
interdiction problem as in Scaparra and Church (2008a). If Ind is fortified then the 
protection resources are exhausted, and we select the fourth terminal on the list generated 
in step one, i.e., Cha, which would be interdicted along with Atl. The process continues as 
outlined in Figure 3-1, except that we have done away with the need to solve the 
interdictor’s problem at each node and simply consult the list generated in step one. This 
has a positive bearing on the computational time, which for the given problem instance 
was 37.86 seconds compared to 76.5 seconds using the enumeration technique of 
Scaparra and Church (2008a).   
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It is important to reiterate that the proposed traffic-based heuristic worked well for the 
small problem instances in which only two terminals being fortified/attacked, but may not 
for much larger instances.  
To conclude, the proposed heuristic is quicker than the other two solution techniques. 
Table 3-1 reports the relevant figures, where BC refers to the Base-Case (the situation in 
which the system performs its normal operations and no attack has happened), CE to 
complete enumeration, IE to the implicit enumeration scheme of Scaparra and Church 
(2008a), and Heuristic to the proposed traffic-based heuristic.   
Due 
Date 
Demand 
Level 
CPU Time (Seconds) 
BC CE IE Heuristic 
Short 
Low 5.81 902.14 76.50 37.86 
Medium 7.90 1313.36 142.87 48.12 
High 1.48 260.48 17.91 9.32 
Regular 
Low 7.82 1362.13 123.33 49.52 
Medium 1.15 1282.12 285.51 32.57 
High 1.11 243.00 16.30 7.23 
Long 
Low 25.31 2063.18 336.24 149.87 
Medium 1.08 241.10 26.54 7.14 
High 9.66 859.00 96.80 55.72 
Table 3-1 Summary of computation time 
3.6.3.1 Numerical Analysis 
In this subsection, we will first provide a snapshot of the solution for the nine scenarios 
developed using the due date and demand level combinations as outlined in section 4.2, 
and then comment on terminal utilization and network connectivity.   
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3.6.3.2 Analysis of Results 
Following the enumeration, the resulting costs for all the leaf nodes (i.e., dark shade) was 
compared to conclude that the optimum strategy is to fortify Phi and Atl, which means 
that the interdictor would disrupt Chi and Ind and the system cost will be $11,944,726. 
Table 3-2 summarizes the results for the nine scenarios of due date and demand. For each 
scenario, three cases were considered: base case which is the normal situation of the 
system; interdiction without fortification, and interdiction with fortification. This 
categorization amounts to twenty-seven problem cases.   
It is clear from all the nine scenarios that fortification improves the performance of the 
transportation system thereby resulting in lower costs vis-à-vis no protection.  In fact, for 
the short due date setting, the performance improvement ranges from 7% for low to 9.2% 
for high demand levels. In other words, fortification has reduced the adverse effect of 
interdiction in each setting. It was noticed that the improvement was higher for scenarios 
where due dates were short and demand high versus long due date and low demand.  
Finally, express train service was mainly used with short due dates because of the 
pressure to deliver before the specified time and to prevent the penalty cost.   
In terms of the traffic distribution, in the base case of all scenarios, no direct trucking has 
been used. With the occurrence of interdiction, the direct trucking service is taking place. 
Also, having fortification in place helps reduce the reliance of expensive truck-only 
transportation and return more traffic to the intermodal system which leads to an 
enormous cost reduction. 
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Due 
Date 
Demand 
Level 
Cases OFV 
($ mns) 
Percent of Traffic Intermodal Trains 
Intermodal Truck Regular Express 
Short 
Low 
Base Case 9.93 100 0 25 12 
W/out Fort 12.84 46.22 53.78 16 6 
With Fort 11.94 66.07 33.93 19 5 
Medium 
Base Case 10.99 100 0 26 10 
W/out Fort 14.34 44.05 54.95 17 6 
With Fort 13.26 66.19 33.81 19 5 
High 
Base Case 13.61 100 0 36 14 
W/out Fort 17.80 43.18 56.82 15 8 
With Fort 16.15 59.81 40.19 19 11 
Regular 
Low 
 
Base Case 9.67 100 0 36 0 
W/out Fort 12.71 46.23 53.77 22 0 
With Fort 11.78 66.08 33.92 24 0 
Medium 
 
Base Case 10.70 100 0 36 0 
W/out Fort 14.20 43.05 54.95 23 0 
With Fort 13.07 66.18 33.82 25 0 
High 
 
Base Case 13.26 100 0 48 3 
W/out Fort 17.65 43.18 56.82 27 0 
With Fort 16.18 63.82 34.18 32 1 
Long 
Low 
 
Base Case 9.60 100 0 36 0 
W/out Fort 12.67 46.23 53.77 22 0 
With Fort 11.73 66.08 33.92 24 0 
Medium 
 
Base Case 10.62 100 0 36 0 
W/out Fort 14.16 45.05 54.95 24 0 
With Fort 13.02 66.19 33.81 25 0 
High 
 
Base Case 13.17 100 0 48 0 
W/out Fort 17.60 43.18 56.82 27 0 
With Fort 16.12 65.82 34.18 33 0 
Table 3-2: Snapshot of the nine scenarios 
3.6.3.3 Capacity and Network Connectivity  
It should be clear that since interdiction of terminals renders them unusable, relevant 
traffic would have to be re-routed using alternative terminals thereby impacting their 
utilization.  Since each terminal in the network has a finite capacity, it may not always be 
possible to reassign traffic to other terminals. In other situations, an interdiction may 
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result in shippers and/or receivers losing their connectivity to the intermodal network and 
in such cases demand would have to be met using direct trucking service. In this 
subsection, we analyze average capacity utilization of terminals and the lack of 
connectivity for the twenty-seven cases under the nine scenarios (Table 3-3). The lack of 
connectivity is defined as the total number of containers originating from customers who 
lost their connections to the network due to the interdiction divided by the total demand in 
the network.       
Within each scenario, the Base Case has the highest average capacity utilization resulting 
from the connectedness of all shippers/ receivers and the proper working of all terminals, 
which also implies no direct truck service. Within each scenario, interdiction without 
fortification (i.e., W/out Fort) has the lowest capacity utilization since 23% of the 
customers have lost connectivity with the intermodal network, and have to make use of 
the direct trucking service to move shipments. It was noticed that interdiction with 
fortification (i.e., With Fort) yielded better capacity utilization than the without settings 
because the worst-case disruptions have been avoided, and relatively fewer customers 
lose connectivity to the intermodal network. In eight of the nine scenarios, 19% of the 
traffic loses connectivity and in one scenario only 3% of traffic is losing the connectivity. 
This shows that in the most difficult scenario, short due date and high demand, 
fortification is able to retain connectivity better than other scenarios. stemming from the 
fortification of Phi and Atl, and the interdiction of Chi and Ind. Finally, it was observed 
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that for a given due date level, average capacity utilization was linearly related to the 
demand level. 
Due 
Date 
Demand 
Level 
Cases 
Avg. 
Cap. 
Utz. 
Number of terminals (utilization) 
% 
loss 
Upto
25 
Upto
50 
Upto
65 
Upto
80 
Upto
90 
Upto
100 
Short 
Low 
Base Case 72% 0 0 1 14 3 0 0 
W/out Fort 53% 4 6 4 2 0 2 23 
With Fort 60% 3 3 3 7 2 0 19 
Medium 
Base Case 80% 0 0 0 11 7 0 0 
W/out Fort 57% 4 3 6 2 1 2 23 
With Fort 66% 2 3 4 4 4 1 19 
High 
Base Case 95% 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 
W/out Fort 66% 4 2 3 5 1 3 23 
With Fort 81% 2 0 5 2 1 8 3 
Regular 
Low 
 
Base Case 72% 0 0 2 14 1 1 0 
W/out Fort 52% 4 7 4 1 0 2 23 
With Fort 62% 3 3 3 6 2 1 19 
Medium 
 
Base Case 79% 0 0 0 10 7 1 0 
W/out Fort 55% 4 3 8 0 1 2 23 
With Fort 68% 2 3 4 5 1 3 19 
High 
 
Base Case 96% 0 0 0 0 2 16 0 
W/out Fort 63% 3 4 2 6 0 3 23 
With Fort 81% 2 2 3 2 1 8 19 
Long 
Low 
 
Base Case 71% 0 0 5 10 2 1 0 
W/out Fort 52% 4 6 5 1 0 2 23 
With Fort 62% 3 3 4 5 2 1 19 
Medium 
 
Base Case 79% 0 0 2 8 7 1 0 
W/out Fort 55% 4 3 8 0 1 2 23 
With Fort 67% 2 3 5 3 3 2 19 
High 
 
Base Case 96% 0 0 0 0 1 17 0 
W/out Fort 63% 4 3 7 1 0 3 23 
With Fort 81% 2 2 3 2 1 8 19 
Table 3-3: Capacity Utilization and Connectivity 
At the end of this section, it should be noted that although the simple flow-based heuristic 
developed here is able to solve the problem efficiently, for larger attack/defense budgets, 
it is quite incapable of doing so. Therefore there is a need to develop a new solution 
technique to cope with larger problem instances. In the next section a solution algorithm 
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based on decomposition will be introduced which is quite capable of dealing with the 
computational burden of large instances of this problem. 
3.7 Conclusion  
In this chapter, we developed a path-based version of the tri-level DAD framework to 
reduce the computational difficulty of this problem. The resulting complexity, and the 
model characteristics, motivated the development of an efficient solution technique. 
Specifically, a traffic-based heuristic has been proposed to solve small instances of the 
DAD problem on the realistic infrastructure of a class I railroad operator. Also, the 
computational performance of the proposed traffic-based heuristic was compared with the 
existing technique.   
It should be mentioned here that the proposed solution technique in this chapter is using a 
combination of implicit enumeration of Scaparra and Church (2008a), to break the tri-
level problem into a set of bi-levels, and then uses a traffic-based heuristic to solve each 
bi-level problems. Thus, the proposed method extends the method proposed by Scaparra 
and Church (2008a), which is only useful in bi-level settings, to be applicable for tri-level 
setting.    
Preliminary results of applying the traffic-based solution technique to larger problem 
instances, i.e. problems with more than two attacks/defenses, show a declining trend in 
the quality of its solutions. This indicates the need for a more advanced solution 
technique for dealing with large-scale problem instances.   
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Chapter 4: A Decomposition-based Solution Technique 
for Protection Planning of a Rail-Truck Intermodal 
Terminal Network 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a new solution technique to solve large instances of the DAD problem is 
proposed. The new solution technique benefits from decomposing the three-level DAD 
problem into smaller sub-problems which can be solved efficiently. This enables the 
proposed solution technique to solve fairly large problem instances. The new solution 
technique has been applied to different problem instances derived from the realistic case 
study defined in Chapter Two. The results of solving these instances by the 
decomposition based solution technique prove the merits of this solution technique in 
terms of the quality of the obtained solutions and computational time. 
4.2 Decomposition based Heuristic 
As it is mentioned in Chapter Three, the proposed traffic-based heuristic is not able to 
produce solutions of high quality for large problem instances of the DAD problem. This 
generates motivation for developing an efficient solution technique for larger instances of 
the DAD problem.  
To begin with the new solution technique, it is important to note that problem (P), shown 
in section 3.4.1, is a very complex and difficult problem. In fact, it has been proved that 
even a bi-level problem is NP-hard (Jeroslow, 1985), and therefore (P), as a tri-level 
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problem, is at least NP-hard. In order to solve (P) efficiently, a two stage solution 
technique is proposed. In the first stage, an implicit enumeration technique as proposed in 
Scaparra and Church (2008a) is used to break the tri-level DAD problem into a set of 
smaller bi-level AD sub-problems (Figure 3-1). In the second stage, the proposed 
decomposition-based solution technique solves each resulting AD, and the set of 
decisions leading to the lowest cost subsequent attack is the best fortification plan.   
4.2.1 The First Stage 
The Implicit Enumeration technique reduces the computational burden of the outermost 
level (i.e., network operator) by implementing a rather simple but intuitive observation.  It 
states that the optimal solution of the network operator should entail fortification of at 
least one of the terminals that would be interdicted in the worst-case attack (Scaparra and 
Church, 2008a).  
It is important to reiterate that the implicit enumeration scheme of Scaparra and Church 
(2008a) reduces the tri-level DAD problem to a set of bi-level AD problems, and then 
each bi-level AD problem needs to be solved. After solving all the generated bi-level AD 
problems, we can determine the best protection plan.  We next propose an efficient 
solution technique for the bi-level AD problems.   
4.2.2 The Second Stage 
The prevalent technique for solving AD problems is based on duality theory, wherein the 
dual of the inner problem is combined with the outer problem to create a single-level 
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problem (Wood, 2011).  It is important to note that this approach would work only if the 
variables in the inner problem are real valued, or if integer, they can be relaxed without 
losing integrality. The innermost component of (P) contains train frequency variables, 
which are inherently integers, and hence cannot be relaxed without losing accuracy. To 
overcome this difficulty and to solve AD problems properly, we adapt the classical 
Bender’s decomposition technique (Benders, 1962) to account for the integer variables in 
the inner problem, which is consistent with the approach in the literature (Gabriel, Shim, 
Conejo, de la Torre, & García-Bertrand, 2010; Losada,  Scaparra, Church & Daskin, 
2012).   
The proposed decomposition breaks the bi-level AD problem into a master problem (MP) 
and a sub-problem (SP). In the first step, SP (which is the intermodal operator’s problem) 
is solved to determine the routing plan and the optimum number of intermodal train 
services, wherein the latter are integer valued. The output of SP becomes the parameters 
used to build the MP, which is a single level interdictor’s problem. To make this more 
explicit, we next outline the specific steps involved.   
Once the SP is solved and the train frequency variables are fixed to their optimum 
(integer) values, the intermodal operator’s problem exhibits unimodularity, i.e., which 
means that other integer variables could be relaxed without obtaining non-integer values 
(Wolsey, 1998). Thus, the dual of the intermodal operator’s problem can be taken. To that 
end, we define three sets of dual variables corresponding to constraints (9) to (11) in (P).   
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                                                                         (9) 
      
 
         
                                              (10) 
      
 
       
           
                                          (11) 
If the dual of the intermodal operator’s problem is attached to the interdictor’s problem, 
we end up with the following objective function: 
                                                  (15) 
which can be simplified to the following form:  
                                              (16) 
Since this objective function is independent of variable  , we can further simplify it to 
obtain the following objective function: 
                                                                               (17) 
This objective function is subject to the following constraints: 
               
 
                    
  
                    (18) 
                         (19) 
        
                   (20) 
72 
 
                  (21) 
                                  (22) 
                  (23) 
               
    (24) 
                     (25) 
where, 
   
   
   
      
                  
      
   
                  
                                                              (26) 
     
                               
                     
                                                               (27) 
Note that (16)-(27) represents a single level problem that optimizes both the interdictor’s 
and the dual of the intermodal operator’s problem over all the variables. 
It is important to note that the objective function (16) has some non-linear terms in the 
form of          , since both    and    are decision variables, and therefore it cannot 
be solved easily. Therefore, we next outline a suitable linearization scheme to facilitate 
solving the combined single level AD problem.   
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4.2.3 Linearization Scheme 
Each non-linear term of                  can take two values depending on the 
value of the binary variable   . It can be       if     , or it is zero if     .  Now, 
we replace each term           by a new variable called   , and add constraints sets 
(28) to (30) to ensure that    will get the right values. Note that M is a large positive 
number.   
                   (28) 
                     (29) 
              (30) 
If     , (28) and (29) will ensure that       and      , respectively.  Note that 
the intersection of the boundaries of these three constraints is      .  
Also, because it is a maximization problem and    is negative, the correct value of    
would be   . On the other hand, if     , the intersection of the boundaries of all the 
three inequalities would imply     .   
To formalize the discussion in this section, we next introduce the notations and 
parameters used to outline the pseudo code for the decomposition algorithm to solve the 
bi-level AD problems (Figure 4-1). Finally, we depict the interaction between the master 
problem and the sub-problem in Figure 4-2.   
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Notations and Parameters 
MP:  Master problem 
SP:  Sub-problem 
LB:  Lower bound 
UB:  Upper bound 
h:  Index for iteration of the solution algorithm 
      List of interdicted terminals in the MP at iteration h 
     
    Objective function value of the sub-problem 
     
    Objective function value of the Master problem 
      Vector of the optimal customer allocation to intermodal paths in iteration h 
      Vector of the optimal frequency of train services in iteration h 
      Vector of the optimal customer allocation to intermodal paths so far 
Max_iteration: Maximum number of iterations 
     The desired optimality gap 
Initial values 
       
       
     
      
While             and                   
Solve SP (  ) to determine the best load plan   , the frequency of trains    and 
     
  
If (     
     , then:       and   
     and         
  
If (            , then go to the Report. 
Solve MP (  ) to determine the interdiction plan     and      
  
If (     
     , then:         and         
  
If (            , then go to the Report. 
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Return to the While condition 
Report   ,  ,        
  and      
  as the outputs of the solution algorithm. 
END 
Figure 4-1: Pseudo code for the decomposition algorithm 
 
Figure 4-2: Interaction between the master problem and the sub-problem 
4.3 Numerical Analysis 
In this section, we first provide an outline of the case study developed using realistic 
publicly available information, along with the estimation of the relevant parameters. We 
then discuss the solution, algorithmic efficiency, and managerial insights.   
4.3.1 Problem setting 
The analytical framework developed in this section was applied to problem instances 
generated using the realistic railroad infrastructure of a class I railroad operator in the 
United States introduced earlier in section 2.5. Parameters like cost and terminal 
capacities are similar to what have been introduced in section 3.5. Also, in this section, 
we focus on medium level of the demand and due date.  
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Finally, we set the optimality gap   in the decomposition algorithm to 1%, and the 
maximum number of iterations to 10.   
4.3.2 Solution 
The analytical framework was implemented in C# using CPLEX 12.6.0 concert 
technology on a PC with Core 2 Quad, 2.4 GHz processor with 4 GB of RAM.  For 
expositional reasons, and also to demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed solution 
methodology, we define four scenarios. The first scenario, referred to as EX, finds the 
exact solution for the proposed DAD problem and therefore it applies the optimal 
fortification. It makes use of the implicit enumeration, to transform DAD problem to a set 
of ADs, and then uses the complete enumeration technique to find the optimal solution of 
each AD problem. The second scenario, referred to as PH, finds a heuristic solution for 
the DAD problem. It makes use of the implicit enumeration technique to transform the 
DAD to a set of ADs, and then uses the proposed decomposition-based heuristic to solve 
each produced AD. The third scenario, referred to as WC, solves an AD problem to 
identify the critical terminals and then fortifies them. To find the solution of the AD 
problem, WC uses a complete enumeration. Note that, as explained in Figure 3-1, this is 
equivalent to providing the list of worst-case disruption to the root node to initialize the 
implicit enumeration scheme. Finally, for comparative assessment, we also indicate the 
solution for interdiction without fortification instances, and refer to them as NO.  It is 
important to reiterate that no terminal is defended under this scenario, which is qualified 
via NO* in the last column in Table 4-1.   
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Number of terminals Scenarios ($) 
Fortified Interdicted EX PH WC NO* 
0 0 10,700,751 
1 1 12,620,928 12,842,074 
2 2 13,073,754 14,202,436 
3 3 12,746,283 13,894,151 15,174,754 
4 4 12,717,366 14,180,059 15,731,475 
5 5 12,777,930 12,818,637 13,073,155 16,293,981 
6 6 12,517,981 13,030,159 16,487,783 
7 7 12,236,503 13,256,471 16,600,378 
8 8 15,793,979 12,474,923 16,655,991 16,681,282 
9 9 15,206,223 12,284,193 16,735,853 16,769,569 
Table 4-1: Objective function values for the four scenarios 
The first row of Table 4-1 depicts the situation where no terminal is either fortified or 
interdicted; hereafter referred to as the Base-Case, and returns a single unique solution 
across all scenarios.  The nine subsequent rows provide a snapshot of the results when 
both the number of terminals fortified and interdicted is increased.  While we provide the 
details on the CPU time later in this section, it is important to indicate that the last two 
problem instances (i.e., shaded in grey) could not be solved within a reasonable amount 
of time.  Hence, the reported solutions are the best ones encountered within the cut-off 
times of three hours and six hours for these two instances, respectively.   
From Table 4-1 we derive five interesting points.  
 First, all the scenarios with fortification outperform the one without, and that it 
exhibits increasing cost with higher numbers of interdicted terminals.  The latter point 
should be clear since higher numbers of interdicted terminals implies increased 
reliance on the more expensive transportation option, i.e., direct truck service.   
78 
 
 Second, scenario WC does not provide a better solution than either EX or PH.  This 
result is consistent with observations of Church and Scaparra (2008a, b) and Brown et 
al. (2006) who advise against using the output of the interdiction model to make 
fortification decisions, since such strategies are suboptimal and will never provide the 
best protection against worst-case disruptions.   
 Third, the proposed decomposition heuristic is able to find the optimal solution in all 
but one problem instance. This clearly proves the high quality of solutions obtained 
by this method.    
 Fourth, for both EX and PH, compared to WC, the cost shows less fluctuations and 
even with the increase in the number of attacked/defended terminals it starts 
decreasing which is in sharp contrast with the trend observed in NO scenario. The 
cost associated with implementing each of these four defense scenarios has been 
plotted in Figure 4-3 for different numbers of attacked/defended terminals. It is 
obvious in this figure that PH demonstrates the best performance compared to other 
scenarios since it shows a very consistent and generally decreasing trend. We 
postulate that the costs would decrease further if the program was allowed to naturally 
terminate for the eight- and nine-terminals problem instances. This is because 
although the number of terminals interdicted increases, the defender is also able to 
fortify a larger number of (more important) terminals, which in turn forces the 
interdiction of terminals not likely to increase the resulting cost. 
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 Fifth, for the last two rows and within the specified cut-off time, the best encountered 
solutions with PE are much better than that with EX. We elaborate on this when 
discussing the computational time. Also, the cost associated with implementing WC 
increases sharply for 8 and 9 attacked/defended terminals and this scenario indeed 
produces results as poor as the results of the NO scenario.   
 
Figure 4-3: Cost imposed to the system following each defense scenario 
Table 4-2 depicts the split of traffic between the rail-truck intermodal system and the 
expensive truck-only option under the different problem settings. As expected, the entire 
traffic uses the intermodal option when the infrastructure is functioning normally, i.e., 
Base-Case.  Note that the proportion of shipments using the truck-only option increases 
with the number of terminals interdicted for the NO scenario, which is expected because 
fewer train services could be routed on the reduced network.  Furthermore, as indicated in 
Table 4-1, WC results in a suboptimal fortification plan, since the proportion of traffic 
using the expensive truck-only option is only better than the NO scenario. Finally, under 
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both EX and PH, the proportion of traffic using truck-only maxes out around 40%, which 
demonstrates the effectiveness of both fortification strategies in ensuring that the majority 
of the intermodal network are operational –irrespective of the interdiction budget. The 
above observations are entirely supported by the number of trains of both regular and 
express types being used in the four scenarios (Table 4-3). It should be evident that with 
the higher number of interdictions (and fortifications) faster trains are used when possible 
to avoid late deliveries.   
Number of terminals Percent of traffic between T/ RT 
Fortified Interdicted EX PH WC NO* 
0 0 0/100 
1 1 28.3/71.7 34.4/65.6 
2 2 33.9/66.1 55.0/45.0 
3 3 
33.7/66.3 
51.4/48.6 64.9/35.1 
4 4 56.1/43.9 79.9/20.1 
5 5 38.2/61.8 40.3/59.7 47.5/52.5 84.1/14.9 
6 6 30.5/69.5 41.7/58.3 90.4/9.6 
7 7 26.0/74.0 46.5/53.5 93.4/6.6 
8 8 75.8/24.2 28.5/71.5 96.0/4.0 95.0/5.0 
9 9 66.2/33.8 24.7/75.3 98.3/1.7 99.1/0.9 
Table 4-2: Traffic split between truck-only (T) and rail-truck intermodal (RT) 
Number of terminals Number of Express/ Regular trains 
Fortified Interdicted EX PH WC NO* 
0 0 0/36 
1 1 0/28 0/27 
2 2 0/25 0/23 
3 3 
1/26 
1/20 0/20 
4 4 1/19 0/12 
5 5 1/24 1/20 0/10 
6 6 0/26 0/24 0/6 
7 7 1/29 1/22 0/5 
8 8 0/13 1/30 0/4 0/4 
9 9 1/15 0/31 0/3 0/1 
Table 4-3: Number of intermodal train services 
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4.3.3 Computational Performance 
We next comment on the computational performance of the proposed heuristic. Table 4-4 
reveals that the number of possible outcomes needing evaluation increases exponentially 
with the number of terminals fortified and interdicted, which in turn impacts the CPU 
time. Although the computation time for both EX and WC is rather comparable, the latter 
results in suboptimal solutions and hence is not of much interest. PH is able to return 
solutions as good as EX, except for one problem instance (Table 4-1), in much shorter 
time.  It is easy to see that this is possible because while both EX and PH are benefiting 
from  the implicit enumeration scheme to convert the tri-level problem into a set of bi-
level AD problems, in the PH each of the resulting ADs is solved efficiently by the 
heuristic decomposition depicted in Figure 4-2 (and Section 4.2.2). In the EX, on the 
other hand, each bi-level AD is solved by embarking on the complete enumeration of all 
the possible attack possibilities. In an effort to further highlight the effectiveness of the 
decomposition component of PH, we have listed, under the title HD, the total CPU time 
required for executing the heuristic decomposition, described in the pseudo code of 
Figure 4-2. It should be clear that in this table while both WC and the proposed 
decomposition scheme are solving bi-level AD problems to find the worst-case attack, the 
latter is able to return the solutions that WC returns, i.e. the highest quality solutions, in 
significantly lower CPU time. In fact, the performance of the proposed heuristic in 
solving AD problems is independent of the attack budget while the performance of the 
WC is sharply impaired by an increase in the attack budget. Finally, it is important to note 
that the major part of the computation time under PH must be attributed to the first stage, 
82 
 
i.e., the implicit enumeration scheme outlined previously, since the implicit enumeration 
transforms the DAD problem into too many bi-level ADs. Although each of the produced 
ADs can be solved very efficiently, by using the proposed decomposition heuristic, 
solving a lot of them will eventually increase the CPU time. In Chapter Five, we will 
demonstrate a metaheuristic-based tree search process, which enables us to transform the 
DAD problem to a fewer number of bi-level ADs so that the execution of PH can be 
expedited.   
# Fortified/ 
Interdicted 
# Possible 
Outcomes 
EX 
PH 
Total             HD 
WC 
1 18 77 10 3.09 77 
2 153 286 33 2.92 286 
3 816 1,570 86 2.12 1,569 
4 3,060 5,747 364 2.32 5,745 
5 8,568 15,450 1,206 2.01 15,435 
6 18,564 32,271 3,361 1.96 32,117 
7 31,824 47,395 13,304 2.02 46,314 
Table 4-4: CPU time (seconds) for the three fortification techniques 
4.3.4 Insights 
In this section, we comment on the intermodal terminals that should be fortified, and also 
provide some insights on their utilization under different problem instances.  The 
terminals which are fortified are exactly the same for EX and PH, except in one problem 
instance. For the five-terminal problem instance, the intermodal terminal at Chicago was 
fortified under EX, and Jacksonville under PH. As indicated earlier, since the output of 
the interdiction model is used to make fortification decisions in WC, the list of terminals 
has less similarity to the other two.   
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Finally, it should be clear that since interdiction of terminals renders them unusable, 
relevant traffic would have to be re-routed using alternative terminals thereby impacting 
their utilization. Since each terminal in the network has a finite capacity, it may not 
always be possible to reassign traffic to other available terminals in the network. Also, an 
interdiction may result in shippers and/or receivers losing their connectivity to the 
intermodal network and in such cases demand would have to be met using direct trucking 
service. For expositional reasons, and without losing generality, we analyze terminal 
capacity utilization for three distinct problem instances: Base-Case; and, 
fortification/interdiction of three-terminal and seven-terminal problem instances (as 
shown in Table 4-5).   
Number 
Fortified 
Number 
Attacked Cases 
Avg. Cap. 
Utz. 
Number of Terminals on each 
Category of Utilization 
% 
loss 
<25 <50 <65 <80 <90 <100 
0 
0 Base-Case 79% 0 0 0 10 7 1 0 
3 
NO 
46% 6 4 6 0 1 1 71.7 
7 26% 14 2 0 1 0 1 95 
3 3 
WC 61% 4 4 2 4 1 3 37 
EX 
68% 3 3 1 7 3 1 24.7 
PH 
7 7 
WC 58% 9 1 3 2 0 3 31.4 
EX 
68% 10 0 2 2 2 2 1 
PH 
Table 4-5: Capacity utilization of the terminals 
As expected the average capacity utilization of active terminals is the highest under the 
Base-Case, which results from normal functioning of all terminals and not using any 
direct trucking service. With no fortification, the average utilization drops from 46% to 
26% when the number of terminals interdicted increases from three to seven and the loss 
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in connectivity increases from 71% to 95%. Therefore, with no fortification, it is almost 
impossible to connect shippers and receivers by the rail truck intermodal network when 
seven terminals have been attacked. It was interesting that the average capacity utilization 
under both EX and PH was always better than that under WC. Also, with the increase in 
the number of fortified and attacked terminals from three to seven, while WC shows a 
drop in the average capacity utilization from 61% to 58%, the capacity utilization under 
EX and PH was stable at 68%. In terms of the loss in connectivity, with the increase in 
the number of fortified/attacked terminals, all the defense strategies, i.e. WC, EX and PH, 
show a decreasing trend. Specifically, the drop in the loss of connectivity under EX and 
PH is remarkable such that almost all the demands could be shipped by the rail-truck 
intermodal network. This highlights the importance of having suitable defense strategies 
in place which will enable the rail truck network to deliver almost all the demands from 
the shippers to the receivers even in the tough condition when seven terminals have been 
attacked. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we developed a decomposition-based heuristic to deal with larger 
instances on the realistic infrastructure of a class I railroad operator. In addition, the 
computational efficiencies of proposed heuristics were highlighted in relation to the 
existing techniques.   
Computational experiments shed light on some interesting observations. First, spending 
the finite resources judiciously to fortify a given number of intermodal terminals would 
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improve the post-interdiction performance of the remaining intermodal transportation 
system dramatically. The cost saving of having such a suitable protection plan in place is 
an important input to high level decision makers who need to compare costs and benefits 
of launching this protection plan. Second, contrary to intuition, using the output of the 
Attacker-Defender problems, except for small instances, will never achieve the optimal 
fortification. This means that optimization of fortification should be addressed directly. 
Finally, in most of the cases, the proposed decomposition-based heuristic is capable of 
returning high quality solutions in a reasonable amount of time. Specially, the proposed 
heuristic for solving the AD problems is producing excellent results in a very short time.    
Although the proposed heuristic decomposition, compared to other solution techniques, 
produces the best results, its performance in dealing with large instances drops sharply. 
Such a rapid decline in the computational performance can be attributed to the fact that 
the size of the problems are increasing so fast. Also, it might be the case that the tree 
search component of the decomposition based heuristic is not efficient enough in dealing 
with the sharp increase in the size of the solution space. Therefore, we conjecture that 
there might be a better way to cope with the increased size of the problem. This will 
constitute the inspiration for the next chapter where a more efficient solution technique 
for large-scale instances will be suggested.   
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Chapter 5: Tabu Search Metaheuristic for Solving 
Protection Planning in Rail-Truck Intermodal 
Transportation 
5.1 Introduction 
At the end of the previous chapter we conjectured the reason for the declining 
performance of the proposed decomposition-based heuristic on large instances. To see 
what exactly challenges the proposed decomposition technique in solving large scale 
instances of the DAD efficiently, Table 5-1 provides very useful information.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5-1: Rapid growth of size of the tree search 
According to this table, the number of nodes produced by the implicit enumeration 
technique is increasing very fast when the number of attacks/defenses increases. More 
specifically, in each search tree like Figure 3-1, two types of nodes could be identified: 
processed nodes, and leaves. The processed nodes are those nodes in which a bi-level AD 
problem must be solved (this includes node 3, node 4, and all the dark shade nodes in 
Figure 3-1). The leaves are a subset of processed nodes which are the ending nodes of the 
Number of terminals No of intermediate nodes 
Fortified Interdicted Leaves Processed Total 
2 2 3 6 11 
3 3 14 25 49 
4 4 54 100 199 
5 5 198 370 739 
6 6 745 1,387 2,773 
7 7 2,722 5,281 10,561 
8 8 8,566 17,817 35,633 
9 9 27,551 60,410 120,819 
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tree in which the worst-case attack is prevented in them (this only includes the dark shade 
nodes in Figure 3-1). The total column in this table indicates the total number of nodes 
produced in the search tree. For each problem instance, the difference between the total 
column and the process column indicates the number of nodes in which there is no need 
to solve a bi-level AD problem. The optimal solution is the set of decisions that lead to a 
leaf with the lowest objective function value. As it is clear in Table 5-1, with the increase 
in the number of attacks/defenses, the total number of nodes and especially the total 
number of processed nodes will increase dramatically. Although at each of these 
processed nodes the resulting bi-level problem will be solved very efficiently with the 
proposed solution technique, having too many of these nodes eventually increases the 
computational time and makes the proposed decomposition technique incapable of 
solving big instances of the DAD problem. To circumvent this issue, there is a need for 
another solution technique that bypasses all these intermediate nodes and produces the 
leaves directly. Such a technique should also act intelligently in the solution space and be 
able to find good solutions very fast.  
5.2 Literature Review 
5.2.1 Metaheuristics 
Approximate solution techniques, or heuristics, have been used since the early days of 
operations research to deal with computationally difficult problems. Development of 
complexity theory in the early 197 ’s makes it clear that most of these problems are NP 
hard and, thus, there is little chance to find efficient exact solution techniques for them. 
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As a result of this conclusion, the role of heuristics in solving NP hard optimization 
problems has been recognized since in many cases heuristics are the only practical way to 
handle such problems.   
The most prevalent and simplest heuristic approach is the local search technique 
(Gendreau, 2003). The local search can be imagined as an iterative search that begins with 
an initial feasible solution and then gradually improves it by applying some local 
modifications. At each iteration of this heuristic, local modifications will be applied to the 
current solution and among the produced solutions the best improving one will be 
selected. The search terminates when it faces a local optimum with regard to the local 
transformations that it applies.  
A serious drawback of this heuristic is that the local optimum found, in most of the cases, 
is very far from the global optimum solution. In local search, primary factors that 
influence the quality of the solution obtained and computation time are the richness of the 
set of transformations that are performed at each iteration of the heuristic and the initial 
solution.  In the late 197 ’s and the early 198 ’s, by inspiration from natural 
phenomenon, many other heuristic approaches were proposed which provided better 
results. The advent of these techniques, which Glover (1986) called metaheurstics, 
produced a lot of hope since they help the local searches escape from the local optimum 
trap.  
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Generally speaking, metaheuristics are approximate solution methods that establish a 
connection between local search procedures and higher-level search strategies. Creating 
this link makes the overall search process competent enough to cross over from local 
optima by implementing a thorough and robust search of the solution space.  
While metaheuristics are not able to confirm the optimality of their solutions, this 
weakness seems negligible when considering the fact that exact procedures are often 
unable to find solutions whose quality is close to that obtained by metaheuritics. Such a 
good performance of metaheuristics in recent years, especially in dealing with real life 
optimization problems with a combinatorial nature, has made them the first choice in 
handling computationally difficult problems.  
To better understand differences among metahueristics, there is a need to classify them 
based on their individual characteristics. Among different existing classifications, the 
most important and yet popular one is based on the number of solutions that the 
metaheuristic uses at the same time. In this regard, some metaheuristics work on a 
population of solutions while the others work on a single solution at a time. Algorithms 
working on a single solution are called single thread or trajectory methods and this 
category includes local search based metahueristics like Simulated Annealing, Tabu 
Search and Variable Neighborhood Search. On the other hand, algorithms that perform 
the search on a set of solutions and evolve them together are called population-based 
algorithms. This category includes methods like Genetic Algorithm, Ant Colony 
Optimization and Artificial Immune System.   
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Metahueritics have witnessed enhancements and improvements since their inception. As 
the latest development in metehuristics, hybrid metaheuristics have become more popular 
in the recent years since they take advantage of strengths of each of the individual 
components to better explore the search space. This hybridization includes the 
hybridization of population-based methods with trajectory methods, or hybridization of 
metahueristcs with optimization techniques.  
5.2.2 Tabu Search  
Tabu search was proposed independently by Glover (1986) and Hansen (1986), and has 
witnessed a continuous improvement since then. It has been successfully applied to a 
wide variety of problems and has produced remarkable results on hard combinatorial 
problems, such as quadratic programming (Merz & Freisleben, 2002), vehicle routing 
problems (Gendreau, Hertz, & Laporte, 1994; Taillard, Badeau, Gendreau, Guertin, & 
Potvin, 1997), and flow shop sequencing (Nowicki & Smutnicki, 1996).  
Tabu search is based on the idea that intelligent problem solving must capitalize on the 
synergy of adaptive memory and responsive exploration. The emphasis on adaptive 
memory makes tabu search capable of exploiting strategies that mimic human problem 
solving skills. Having such an adaptive memory enables tabu search to search the solution 
space efficiently and effectively. Since local information gathered during the search forms 
a memory to guide the search, tabu search differs from local searches that do not take 
advantage of memory and thus depend only on semi-random processes that implement a 
form of sampling. Also, the emphasis on responsive exploration stems from the fact that a 
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bad strategic choice can often yield more information than a good random choice since 
the former is able to rectify its path and learn from the past but the later is unable to react 
to the new information. 
To better see the difference between tabu search and a simple descent local search, let us 
assume that the goal is to minimize f(x) where     and the neighborhood of a given 
solution     is characterized by     .  
A simple descent method only allows moves to neighbor solutions that improve the 
current objective function value and it terminates the search when no improving solution 
can be found in the neighborhood of the current solution. The final   obtained by this 
method is indeed a local optimum, since it is at least as good as all the solutions seen so 
far.  
Tabu search, on the other side, permits moves that may impair the current objective 
function value but the moves are chosen from a modified neighborhood          . 
Short term and long term memory structures are both playing roles in determining the 
specific composition of      .  
More specifically, short term memory is responsible to exclude certain elements of      
to form      . Long term memory, on the other hand, may expand       to include 
some solutions not directly found in      such as solutions found in the past history of 
the search that has been identified as high quality neighbors of these past solutions.  
Tabu search, which extends the regular local search, has three main components: 
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 Search space and neighborhood structure; 
 Tabu List; and 
 Aspiration Criteria. 
In the next few subsections, each of these components will be elaborated in more details. 
Search space and neighborhood structure 
The search space of tabu search is the set or collection of all possible solutions that can be 
considered during the search.  
Closely related to the definition of the search space is that of neighborhood structure. If 
we denote the current solution by  , at each iteration of the tabu search, local 
transformations that can be applied on   produce a set of neighboring solutions denoted 
by      in the search space as the neighborhood of solution  . 
Tabu List 
A tabu list is one of the main distinctions of tabu search compared to the local search. The 
idea behind a tabu list is to prevent the search from returning back to where it came from 
and therefore prevent endless cycling from happening. This is achieved by declaring tabu 
moves that reverse the effect of recent moves. Tabu moves are usually stored in short 
term memory and the most commonly used form of implementing the tabu list is to 
prohibit reverse transformations from the current solution. In implementing the tabu list, 
one could record the complete solutions visited recently. Although this implementation is 
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accurate, it requires a lot of storage and may make the search expensive. Alternatively, 
one could record only the last few transformations that have happened on the current 
solution and add them to the tabu list to prohibit the reverse transformations.   
Aspiration Criteria 
While tabu lists are fundamental elements of tabu search, sometimes they are too 
restrictive and may prohibit attractive moves even when there is no danger of cycling. 
Therefore it is necessary to use algorithmic devices, called aspiration criteria, to override 
tabu lists. The simplest and probably most popular criterion is to allow a move listed in 
the tabu list if it leads to a solution with a better objective function than the currently best- 
known objective function.  
5.3 A Simple Outline of Tabu Search Algorithm 
Preliminary Steps 
 Find an initial solution.  
 Set the best solution to the initial solution and set the best objective function 
value based on the objective function value of the initial solution. 
 Set the initial tabu list to empty.   
While termination condition not reached do 
 Search the allowable neighborhood of the current solution.  
 Find the best solution in the allowable neighborhood. 
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 Update the best solution and best objective function value. 
 Form the tabu list for the current solution.  
End 
5.4 Tabu search Implementation for solving the DAD problem 
In this section, an application of tabu search in solving the DAD problem will be 
elaborated. First, we need to clearly define each component of the tabu search algorithm 
and then we outline the algorithm in a flowchart.  
Solution Representation 
Each feasible solution for the Defender’s problem (network operator) is represented by a 
binary array of length   where   is the total number of terminals in the network. When a 
given cell   is filled with 1, the corresponding terminal, i.e. terminal  , will be defended. 
Therefore, the array contains   cells filled by 1 where   is the maximum number of 
terminals that the network operator can protect. The remaining       cells in the 
solution array will be filled with 0.  
Neighborhood Structure  
At each iteration of the search, local transformations that can be applied on the current 
solution generate a set of neighborhood solutions in the search space. In this algorithm, 
the local transformation is defined as swapping the values of two cells when one cell 
contains one and the other contains zero. This type of transformation is called 1-swap and 
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is depicted in Figure 5-1 on a given solution array with 6 terminals (   ) and 3 
defenses (   ). It should be noted that the total number of 1-swap movement on a 
solution array equals to   
 
      
 
         .  
  
Figure 5-1: 1-swap movement 
In the similar way, 2-swap transformation can be applied on a given solution in which 
two cells containing zero values will exchange their contents with two cells containing 
one values. Figure 5-2 shows an example of applying 2-swap transformation on a given 
solution. Also, the total number of 2-swap transformations on a solution array with    
terminals and       defended terminals equals to:   
 
      
 
 . 
 
Figure 5-2: 2-swap movement 
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Tabu List 
The tabu list contains information regarding the four recent swaps. Therefore, it is 
impossible to perform a swap operation between two cells if the reverse of that swap 
happened in the last four iterations of the algorithm. Also, it is important to note that 
when, at the end of an iteration, a swap is happening, the most recent swap is entering the 
list of tabu swaps and the oldest swap is exiting the tabu list and is not considered as a 
tabu swap any more. Therefore, we can think of the tabu list as a First in First out 
(FIFO) queue with the length of four in which with the entrance of a new swap the oldest 
swap leaves the queue. Figure 5-3 depicts the flow chart of the proposed tabu search. To 
fully understand this diagram, the following notation should be introduced.  
 : Index of the number of iterations 
 : Index of the number of iterations without improvement 
  : The initial solution 
  : The current solution 
  : The best solution found in the neighborhood of    
At the beginning of the algorithm, both indexes are set at zero and the current solution is 
set at the initial solution. Also, maximum number of iterations is set at 10 and the 
maximum number of iterations without improvement is set at 4. Then, all the neighbors of 
the current solution will be analyzed and the best one will be selected. If the best neighbor 
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is improving the best solution found so far, then the search continues by increasing the 
index of number of iteration. 
 
Figure 5-3: Flowchart of the proposed tabu search algorithm 
Otherwise, the index of the number of iterations without improvement will be 
incremented. Following that, the stopping condition is checked. The search stops if either 
the number of iterations or the number of consecutive iterations without improvement 
reaches their pre-defined limits. If the search continues, the current solution will be 
replaced with the best solution found in the neighborhood of the previous iteration. In 
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other words, the current solution in each iteration, except for the first iteration, is the best 
solution found in the neighborhood of the previous current solution. The search continues 
until the stopping criteria are met. At the end, the best solution found so far will be 
reported as the output of this algorithm.   
5.5 Numerical Analysis 
In this section, we will pay attention to the results of solving the DAD model with the 
tabu search algorithm described in the previous section. To find the best setting, four 
different variants of the tabu search algorithm, depicted below, have been proposed and 
then coded in C# using CPLEX 12.6.0 concert technology on a PC with Core 2 Quad, 2.4 
GHz processor with 4 GB of RAM. These variants are:   
 Variant 1: In the first variant, the tabu search algorithm starts from a randomly 
generated solution. To generate the neighborhood of the current solution, 1-swap 
transformation is used. 
 Variant 2:  In the second variant, the tabu search algorithm begins with the output 
of the AD problem. In other words, the worst-case attack generated by the 
interdictor is the starting point of the tabu search algorithm. Then, a 1-swap 
transformation is used to generate the neighboring solutions.  
 Variant 3:  In the third variant, the tabu search algorithm begins with a random 
solution. The 2-swap transformation is used to generate the neighboring solutions.  
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 Variant 4:  In the fourth variant, the tabu search algorithm begins with the output 
of the AD problem and the 2-swap transformation is employed to generate the 
neighboring solutions.  
To compare the performances of these four variants of the tabu search algorithm, different 
instances of the DAD problem have been solved by these variants and the results have 
been analyzed according to their objective function values and the computation times. 
Also, to take into account the random starting point in both Variant 1 and Variant 3, each 
problem instance has been solved ten times by these two variants and the average 
objective function value and average computation time have been reported. Furthermore, 
it should be added here that at each of these ten runs, due to the randomness of the 
starting point, Variant 1 and Variant 3 may have similar starting points. 
Table 5-2 shows the objective function values of solving the DAD problem for different 
problem instances (different number of attacked/defended terminals) by four distinct 
variants of the tabu search algorithm.  
According to this table, all variants of the tabu search algorithm are capable of finding the 
optimal solution for different instances of the DAD problem and thus are quite effective 
and accurate. 
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Table 5-2: 
Objective Function Values of Solutions Found by Four Variants of Tabu Search 
Table 5-3 reveals the computational performance of these variants of the tabu search 
algorithm in solving different instances of the DAD problem.  
According to Table 5-3, in comparing Variant 1 and Variant 2, both of which are based 
on 1-swap transformations, Variant 2 shows a much better computational performance. 
The reason why Variant 2 outperforms Variant 1 can be attributed to the fact that this 
variant of the tabu search is taking advantage of results of the AD model to start the 
search with. Although the output of the AD model is not the optimal solution for the 
DAD problem, it could be used as a good starting point.   
 
 
  
      
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
Number of terminals OFV found by Tabu Search 
Fortified interdicted Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 3 Variant 4 
1 1 12,620,928 
2 2 13,073,754 
3 3 12,746,283 
4 4 12,717,366 
5 5 12,744,060 
6 6 12,517,981 
7 7 12,236,503 
8 8 11,878,142 
9 9 11,598,194 
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Table 5-3: Computational Performance of Four Variants of Tabu Search 
Also comparing Variant 3 and Variant 4, which both take advantage of 2-swap 
transformation, confirms that the output of the AD problem should be considered as a 
good starting point for the tabu search algorithm since Variant 4 outperforms Variant 3. 
Examining the results of Variant 2 and Variant 4, which use the output of the AD model 
as the starting point but have different transformations to generate the neighborhood, 
makes it clear the extent to which the type of transformation can influence the 
computational performance. According to this table, while both Variants 2 and Variant 4 
show almost the same performance on very small-scale problem instances, on larger 
instances, Variant 4 needs excessively longer computation time to find the optimal 
solution than Variant 2. This can be attributed to the fact that applying the 2-swap 
transformation produces more neighboring solutions than applying 1-swap transformation 
Number of terminals Computation Time of Tabu Search (Seconds) 
Fortified Interdicted Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 3 Variant 4 
1 1 13 11 15 12 
2 2 210.3 42 759.2 42.9 
3 3 424.3 209 3,501.7 3,031.5 
4 4 968.5 379 7,620.3 3,858.4 
5 5 1,174.2 324 7,613.6 3,395.7 
6 6 1,724.0 407 8,126 4,551.6 
7 7 1,669.8 906 11,664.5 5,549.2 
8 8 2,144.1 917 29,601.2 7,240.9 
9 9 3,270.9 1,668 40,256.62 12,680 
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and thus enlarges the size of the neighborhood at each iteration of the search. This makes 
2-swap transformation less efficient than 1-swap transformation. The same trend is 
observable when comparing Variant 1 and Variant 3 and thus the 1-swap transformation 
is producing a better search space and is considered more efficient than the 2-swap 
transformation.  
It should be concluded from this table that using the output of the AD problem, as the 
starting point, and having 1-swap transformation, to produce the neighborhood, are 
improving the performance of tabu search and thus Variant 2 which benefits from both of 
these two factors should be considered as the optimal design of the tabu search in solving 
the DAD problem.  
5.6 Insights 
Comparing the results of Table 5-3 and Table 4-4 is very informative. It reveals that 
Variant 2, as the optimal design of tabu search, is a viable and efficient solution technique 
for solving big instances of the DAD problem. More specifically, for small instances, i.e. 
4 attacks/defenses or fewer, the decomposition technique proposed in the previous 
chapter is performing better and should be considered as an efficient solution technique. 
This can be attributed to the fact that, in these small instances, the proposed 
decomposition-based technique produces fewer numbers of intermediate nodes and 
therefore is quite efficient for tackling problems of these sizes. On the other hand, for 
large problem instances, Variant 2 of the tabu search is performing much better than the 
decomposition-based solution technique and should be deemed as the dominant solution 
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technique for large problem instances. Consequently, depending on the number of 
attacks/defenses, the appropriate solution technique for solving the DAD problem can be 
identified such that for problems with relatively few attacks/defenses, four or fewer , the 
proposed decomposition-based heuristic should be selected and for problems with more 
than four attacks/defenses, Variant 2 of the proposed tabu search should be picked.   
5.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, a tabu search algorithm for solving the DAD problem has been 
introduced. The results of solving the DAD problem with this algorithm prove the 
competency of this algorithm in dealing with large-scale instances of such a difficult 
problem.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Research 
6.1 Conclusion 
Despite the practical importance of rail-truck intermodal transportation, the research on 
this type of transportation is still in its infancy. In this dissertation, we proposed a set of 
models to improve the performance of this type of transportation in the wake of worst-
case disruptions. In particular, each chapter of this dissertation plays an important role is 
attaining this objective. 
In Chapter Two, the basic mathematical model for defending rail-truck intermodal 
transportation is put forward. Then, two small instances of the proposed model were 
applied to a realistic network of Norfolk Southern, a Class I railroad company in the US, 
and were solved by using CPLEX. The results indicate the effectiveness of having a 
sound fortification plan to hedge against worst-case attacks.  
In Chapter Three, the basic model developed in Chapter Two was expanded. Also, a 
heuristic solution technique-based on the traffic flow information was proposed. The 
traffic-based heuristic proved to be an appropriate solution technique, in terms of 
efficiency and quality of solutions, in solving small-scale problems of fortification 
planning in the Norfolk Southern network. 
In Chapter Four, a heuristic solution technique based on decomposition was proposed. In 
the first stage of this heuristic, the implicit enumeration (Scaparra and Church, 2008a) is 
used to break the DAD problem into a set of AD subproblems. In the second stage, each 
of the AD problems generated in the first stage is solved using a Bender’s decomposition 
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approach. The Bender’s decomposition approach for solving AD subroblems is quite 
efficient and is able to produce high quality results. Also, the decomposition based 
heuristic is able to solve DAD problems and yielding high quality solutions in a 
reasonable amount of time.    
In Chapter Five, an efficient tabu search-based solution technique for solving DAD 
problems is introduced which is able to further improve the performance of the 
decomposition-based heuristic, developed in Chapter Four, especially in large-scale 
problem instances. Different variants for the tabu search-based heuristic, like the initial 
solution and the neighborhood structure, are compared. According to extensive 
experiments, it is determined that the tabu search heuristic that uses the result of the AD 
subproblem, as the initial solution, and takes advantage of 1-swap transformation, as the 
neighborhood structure, outperforms the other variants and thus should be considered in 
solving large instances of the DAD problem. Furthermore, depending on the size of the 
problem instance, the decomposition based heuristic, developed in Chapter Four, or the 
tabu search, developed in Chapter Five, should be used in solving the DAD problem 
instances.   
6.2 Future Directions 
The following suggestions will help improve applicability of this dissertation.   
6.2.1 Network Design Considerations 
The network operator is responsible for long terms decisions. In addition to protection 
planning, the network operator will be responsible for designing the network. More 
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specifically, the network operator could decide about the initial capacity of terminals and 
available services while both of them were assumed to be given in this thesis.  
Terminal capacities could be endogenous to the model such that the initial allocation of 
capacity is performed to ensure that the remaining network always has enough capacity to 
meet the demand in the aftermath of disruptions.  
Design of intermodal train services which is called service network design (Crainic, 
2000) could be decided such that the network always keeps a certain amount of 
connectivity following interdictions. This reduces the need for the high-cost trucking 
system and therefore reduces the cost imposed to the transportation system. 
To add more realism to the current DAD model, empty container distribution (Dejax & 
Crainic, 1987) on the network could also be integrated into the model. In the current 
model, we assumed that empty cars are always available in shippers/receivers locations. 
But, due to the imbalance on the demand, this may not be true and therefore, the network 
operator has to deliberately make a plan to deliver empty containers to the customers.  
Obviously, adding these two important network design aspects to the network operator’s 
responsibilities improves the quality of service for the customers on the demand side. 
However, this augmentation comes with the cost of increasing the size and the complexity 
of the current DAD model. For example, adding the capacity allocation problem to the 
network operator makes the DAD model a nonlinear mixed integer program which is 
inherently more difficult than the current mixed integer DAD model.     
108 
 
6.2.2 Uncertainty and Asymmetric Information  
The current model can be augmented by adding uncertainty elements into different 
aspects of decision making. This suggestion is motivated by the fact that in reality the 
players may not have access to all the information they would need, especially about what 
the other players are opt to, and thus the symmetry of information may not be hold. Thus, 
developing models to work with asymmetric information is of high practical importance. 
For instance, the network operator may not know the exact number or the magnitude of 
attacks in advance. Thus, the operator may have to work with respective probability 
distributions to safeguard the network against the expected number of attacks or against 
expected magnitude of attacks.   
Also, the success of attack and defense actions may not be guaranteed such that a given 
attack is successful with a certain probability or, in the same way, a given defense is 
successful with a certain probability.   
6.2.3 Random Attacks 
Instead of defending the system against worst-case attacks, we could consider defending 
the system against random attacks. The idea is that instead of safeguarding against 
unlikely worst-case attacks, it’s good to be prepared for high probability random 
disruptions in the system. Ideally, it is appropriate to be prepared for both kinds of 
disruptions, i.e. random and worst-case; at the same time which has been called the all-
hazard approach by Zhuang and Bier (2007). 
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Embracing random disruptions, either instead of or together with worst-case ones, needs 
fundamental changes in the way the interdictor operates. Obviously, this will create more 
reasonable and realistic results but requires more computational changes as well.   
6.2.4 Efficient Solution Methods for the Intermodal Operator’s Problem  
The intermodal operators’ problem, or the inner-most problem, is a capacitated multi-
commodity network flow problem with train frequency variables and is currently solved 
using the CPLEX solver.  
Preliminary investigations showed that solving the intermodal operator’s problem for a 
larger data set is very difficult and challenging for CPLEX. Therefore, new solution 
techniques, including heuristic ones, should be considered in solving the intermodal 
operator’s problem for large scale instances. For instance, Benders decomposition 
(Benders, 1962) or dual-ascent methods (Barnhart, 1993) could be considered to solve the 
intermodal operator’s problem in a more efficient way.  
Solving the intermodal operator’s problem more efficiently also enables a deeper 
evaluation of the efficiency of the proposed decomposition technique and the proposed 
tabu search since it allows solving a larger data set by them. This will reveal more 
insights about the weaknesses and strengths of these techniques.  
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Appendix A: Defined Train Services on the Network 
Service 
Number 
Origin Destination Intermediate Stop(s) 
1 Atlanta Detroit Knoxville 
2 Atlanta New York Knoxville 
3 Atlanta Philadelphia Charlotte, Richmond 
4 Charlotte Chicago Indianapolis 
5 Charlotte Detroit Columbus 
6 Charlotte New York - 
7 Chicago Charlotte Indianapolis, Cincinnati 
8 Chicago Jacksonville Indianapolis, Atlanta 
9 Chicago New York - 
10 Chicago Philadelphia Pittsburg 
11 Cincinnati Jacksonville Knoxville, Atlanta, Macon 
12 Columbus Norfolk Pittsburgh 
13 Detroit New York Columbus 
14 Detroit Philadelphia Cleveland, Pittsburgh 
15 Indianapolis Atlanta - 
16 Indianapolis New York Cleveland 
17 Indianapolis Philadelphia Columbus, Pittsburgh 
18 Jacksonville Chicago Atlanta, Indianapolis 
19 Jacksonville Philadelphia Richmond 
20 Columbus Philadelphia Pittsburgh 
21 New York Atlanta Roanoke, Knoxville 
22 New York Charlotte Richmond 
23 New York Chicago Cleveland, Fort Wayne 
24 New York Detroit Columbus 
25 New York Indianapolis Pittsburgh, Columbus 
26 Philadelphia Atlanta Roanoke, Knoxville 
27 Philadelphia Chicago Columbus, Fort Wayne 
28 Philadelphia Detroit Pittsburgh, Cleveland 
29 Philadelphia Indianapolis Cleveland, Columbus 
30 Philadelphia Jacksonville Richmond 
31 Philadelphia Memphis Roanoke 
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Appendix B 
Defended 
Terminal 
Attacked Terminal Resulting Cost 
($) 
1 Chicago 11620650 
2 Fort Wayne 10922063 
3 Detroit 10957771 
4 Cleveland 10833657 
5 New York 10924925 
6 Indianapolis 11906369 
7 Columbus 11130345 
8 Pittsburgh 11257889 
9 Philadelphia 12263378 
10 Cincinnati 10912389 
11 Roanoke 10833657 
12 Richmond 11645654 
13 Norfolk 10942267 
14 Knoxville 10965458 
15 Charlotte 11515479 
16 Atlanta 12641578 
17 Macon 10834852 
18 Jacksonville 11437338 
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Appendix C 
Defended 
Terminal 
Attacked Terminals Resulting Cost 
($) 
1 Chicago, Fort Wayne 11497305 
2 Chicago, Detroit 11697341 
3 Chicago, Cleveland 11437820 
4 Chicago, New York 11480154 
5 Chicago, Indianapolis 13016982 
6 Chicago, Columbus 11622864 
7 Chicago, Pittsburgh 11671667 
8 Chicago, Philadelphia 12771238 
9 Chicago, Cincinnati 11486950 
10 Chicago, Roanoke 11590971 
11 Chicago, Richmond 12230896 
12 Chicago, Norfolk 11516827 
13 Chicago, Knoxville 11547768 
14 Chicago, Charlotte 11922874 
15 Chicago, Atlanta 13105000 
16 Chicago, Macon 11409413 
17 Chicago, Jacksonville 11895539 
19 Fort Wayne, Detroit 10837946 
19 Fort Wayne ,Cleveland 10739310 
20 Fort Wayne, New York 10781656 
21 Fort Wayne ,Indianapolis 11829614 
22 Fort Wayne, Columbus 10920713 
23 Fort Wayne ,Pittsburgh 11004526 
24 Fort Wayne, Philadelphia 12097796 
25 Fort Wayne, Cincinnati 10785805 
26 Fort Wayne, Roanoke 10889826 
27 Fort Wayne, Richmond 11530177 
28 Fort Wayne, Norfolk 10815736 
29 Fort Wayne, Knoxville 10845397 
30 Fort Wayne, Charlotte 11368210 
31 Fort Wayne, Atlanta 12633231 
32 Fort Wayne, Macon 10708268 
33 Fort Wayne, Jacksonville 11307913 
34 Detroit, Cleveland 10775018 
35 Detroit, New York 10823771 
36 Detroit, Indianapolis 11790404 
37 Detroit, Columbus 10962754 
38 Detroit, Pittsburgh 11023391 
39 Detroit, Philadelphia 12153466 
40 Detroit, Cincinnati 10822129 
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41 Detroit, Roanoke 10926150 
42 Detroit, Richmond 11566075 
43 Detroit, Norfolk 10852022 
44 Detroit, Knoxville 10873689 
45 Detroit, Charlotte 11405170 
46 Detroit, Atlanta 12597366 
47 Detroit, Macon 10744592 
48 Detroit, Jacksonville 11337900 
49 Cleveland, New York 10721487 
50 Cleveland, Indianapolis 11723616 
51 Cleveland, Columbus 10947592 
52 Cleveland, Pittsburgh 11075136 
53 Cleveland, Philadelphia 12086612 
54 Cleveland, Cincinnati 10729636 
55 Cleveland, Roanoke 10833657 
56 Cleveland, Richmond 11473582 
57 Cleveland, Norfolk 10759513 
58 Cleveland, Knoxville 10789227 
59 Cleveland, Charlotte 11312041 
60 Cleveland, Atlanta 12578167 
61 Cleveland, Macon 10652099 
62 Cleveland, Jacksonville 11251744 
63 New York, Indianapolis 11743681 
64 New York, Columbus 10908655 
65 New York, Pittsburgh 10975388 
66 New York, Philadelphia 13906575 
67 New York, Cincinnati 10771683 
68 New York, Roanoke 10896389 
69 New York, Richmond 11482407 
70 New York, Norfolk 10801560 
71 New York, Knoxville 10809952 
72 New York, Charlotte 11405490 
73 New York, Atlanta 12647001 
74 New York, Macon 10694146 
75 New York, Jacksonville 11289176 
76 Indianapolis, Columbus 11862696 
77 Indianapolis, Pittsburgh 11813444 
78 Indianapolis, Philadelphia 12931394 
79 Indianapolis, Cincinnati 11801447 
80 Indianapolis, Roanoke 11851345 
81 Indianapolis, Richmond 12489059 
82 Indianapolis, Norfolk 11777202 
83 Indianapolis, Knoxville 11805689 
84 Indianapolis, Charlotte 12222763 
85 Indianapolis, Atlanta 13444974 
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86 Indianapolis, Macon 11669787 
87 Indianapolis, Jacksonville 12193394 
88 Columbus, Pittsburgh 11173583 
89 Columbus, Philadelphia 12231529 
90 Columbus, Cincinnati 10899648 
91 Columbus, Roanoke 11003669 
92 Columbus, Richmond 11643594 
93 Columbus, Norfolk 10857559 
94 Columbus, Knoxville 10959079 
95 Columbus, Charlotte 11467288 
96 Columbus, Atlanta 12747663 
97 Columbus, Macon 10822111 
98 Columbus, Jacksonville 11421755 
99 Pittsburgh, Philadelphia 12328966 
100 Pittsburgh, Cincinnati 10982105 
101 Pittsburgh, Roanoke 11086126 
102 Pittsburgh, Richmond 11726051 
103 Pittsburgh, Norfolk 10977008 
104 Pittsburgh, Knoxville 11041696 
105 Pittsburgh, Charlotte 11560822 
106 Pittsburgh, Atlanta 12817200 
107 Pittsburgh, Macon 10904568 
108 Pittsburgh, Jacksonville 11504213 
109 Philadelphia, Cincinnati 12118403 
110 Philadelphia, Roanoke 12216560 
111 Philadelphia, Richmond 12734222 
112 Philadelphia, Norfolk 12148403 
113 Philadelphia, Knoxville 12164237 
114 Philadelphia, Charlotte 12653748 
115 Philadelphia, Atlanta 13626754 
116 Philadelphia, Macon 12040937 
117 Philadelphia, Jacksonville 12376534 
118 Cincinnati, Roanoke 10874008 
119 Cincinnati, Richmond 11513934 
120 Cincinnati, Norfolk 10799918 
121 Cincinnati, Knoxville 10827772 
122 Cincinnati, Charlotte 11352392 
123 Cincinnati, Atlanta 12605569 
124 Cincinnati, Macon 10691255 
125 Cincinnati, Jacksonville 11292095 
126 Roanoke, Richmond 11607273 
127 Roanoke, Norfolk 10903939 
128 Roanoke, Knoxville 10927077 
129 Roanoke, Charlotte 11477098 
130 Roanoke, Atlanta 12602092 
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131 Roanoke, Macon 10796471 
132 Roanoke, Jacksonville 11399010 
133 Richmond, Norfolk 11543864 
134 Richmond, Knoxville 11564054 
135 Richmond, Charlotte 12034687 
136 Richmond, Atlanta 12910642 
137 Richmond, Macon 11436397 
138 Richmond, Jacksonville 11853388 
139 Norfolk, Knoxville 10859673 
140 Norfolk, Charlotte 11382323 
141 Norfolk, Atlanta 12647291 
142 Norfolk, Macon 10722381 
143 Norfolk, Jacksonville 11322026 
144 Knoxville, Charlotte 11510000 
145 Knoxville, Atlanta 12850683 
146 Knoxville, Macon 10752042 
147 Knoxville, Jacksonville 11350460 
148 Charlotte, Atlanta 13255074 
149 Charlotte, Macon 11274855 
150 Charlotte, Jacksonville 11860872 
151 Atlanta, Macon 12583258 
152 Atlanta, Jacksonville 13120304 
153 Macon, Jacksonville 11237401 
 
 
